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The Presidential Coup
ANTHONY J. GHIOTTO †
What prevents the President from abusing the military
power at his disposal to stage a coup and actively impose
presidential rule upon the United States? What if generations
of presidential assertions of authority, congressional
acquiescence, and judicial abdication have not only laid the
groundwork for the President to use military power to impose
his will, but in fact have legally sanctioned such a
presidential coup? And what if the informal checks and
balances that historically protected against such abuse—
specifically a benevolent President, a constitutionally faithful
military, intra-executive branch checks, and public opinion—
have also eroded to no longer function as checks?
This Article explores these questions by arguing that the
decay of formal and informal checks, buttressed by historical
incrementalism, has created an environment ripe for a
malevolent President to use the military power at his disposal
to effectuate a presidential coup. Legal scholarship seldomly
takes seriously the threat of a presidential coup. Such
reluctance to engage seriously with a presidential coup has
†Assistant
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been understandable, as little historical evidence suggested a
President was likely to turn the military power at his disposal
against the American people. Nonetheless, the increasing use
of the military by the Trump Administration to circumvent
the constitutional design, followed by the use of the military
to quell Black Lives Matter protests in Washington, D.C., and
then culminating in the President’s reluctance and failure to
use the military power at his disposal to defend the U.S.
Capitol during the January 2021 insurrection suggest that
such a threat of a presidential coup is ever-growing and
becoming increasingly realistic. Legal scholarship needs to
engage with the potential of a presidential coup with
seriousness, examining its risk, the means to protect against
it, and whether those means are functioning. This Article
presents a novel framework that does just that.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical: a sitting United
States President, frustrated by Congress’ refusal to act on his
signature legislative agenda, signs a series of executive
orders and deploys the vast administrative state to carry out
his objectives. But when the executive agencies prove unable
or unwilling to carry out his agenda, he turns to the military
to fulfill his objectives. In turn, when state and local
governments pass laws to actively shield themselves from
the impact of these orders, the President declares an
insurrection and deploys the military to break these
“federalism blockades” by taking control of city and state
governments as necessary to enforce his executive orders.
And when the President’s term expires, he finally uses the
military to prevent a peaceful transfer of power and instead
remains in office, enabled and protected by the military
apparatus at his disposal.
This scenario may be less far-fetched than it appears.
Indeed, the first presidential action contemplated above—
presidential deployment of the military to carry out basic
domestic enforcement functions—occurred with regular
frequency during the Trump administration. The second
action—federal militarization of local jurisdictions under the
purview of the Insurrection Act—consequently became a
more realistic probability than at any time since the Civil
War and Reconstruction. 1 And the third and ultimate
action—a refusal to leave office—was a significant enough
risk at the end of the Trump Administration that senior
military leadership had to consider it. 2 While the end of the
Trump administration may have slowed the risk, it was not
1. See Andrew Buttaro, The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and the End of
Reconstruction, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 135, 147–52 (2015) (details the involvement of
federal soldiers in policing the Southern states during Reconstruction).
2. See Susan B. Glasser, “You’re Gonna Have a F**king War”: Mark Milley’s
Fight to Stop Trump from Striking Iran, NEW YORKER (July 15, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-bidens-washington/youre-gonnahave-a-fucking-war-mark-milleys-fight-to-stop-trump-from-striking-iran.
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extinguished, leaving the ultimate question: what legal and
structural checks exist to prevent the use of the military to
effectuate such a “presidential coup”? This Article examines
that question.
The Trump Administration’s use of the military in
domestic matters added a sense of urgency to the question
asked above. Take President Trump’s rhetoric and
frustrations regarding border security between the United
States and Mexico as an example. 3 As a political candidate,
President Trump advocated building a wall to separate the
United States from Mexico, even going as far as to promise
that Mexico would pay for the wall. 4 He campaigned strongly
to replace the informal “catch-and-release” policy of
addressing illegal immigration with federal prosecution. 5
3. See generally Rebecca Morin, A Quick History of Trump’s Evolving
Justifications for a Border Wall, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2019, 9:26 PM), https://www.
politico.com/story/2019/01/08/trumps-evolving-reasons-border-wall-1088046.
4. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 5, 2014, 4:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/496756082489171968 [https://web
.archive.org/web/20170505144255/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/4
96756082489171968] (“SECURE THE BORDER! BUILD A WALL!”); Donald
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 25, 2015, 8:39 AM), https://twitter
.com/realDonaldTrump/status/636155822326829056
[https://web.archive.org
/web/20161114225826/ttps://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/63615582232
6829056]. (“Jeb Bush just talked about my border proposal to build a ‘fence.’ It’s
not a fence, Jeb, it’s a WALL.”); Transcript: Read the Full Text of the CNBC
Republican Debate in Boulder, TIME (Oct. 28, 2015, 11:40 PM), http://time.com
/4091301/republican-debate-transcript-cnbc-boulder/ (Donald Trump said, “As
far as the wall is concerned, we’re going to build a wall. We’re going to create a
border. We’re going to let people in, but they’re going to come in legally. They’re
going to come in legally. And it’s something that can be done, and I get questioned
about that. They built the [G]reat [W]all of China. That’s 13,000 miles. Here, we
actually need 1,000.”); Face the Nation Transcript August 23, 2015: Trump,
Christie & Cruz, CBS NEWS (Aug. 23, 2015, 1:53 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-august-23-2015-trump-christie-cruz/ (Donald
Trump stated, “And, you know, we’re building a wall. And it’s going to be a great
wall. OK? And, by the way, Mexico will pay for it.”).
5. See Full Transcript: Donald Trump’s 2016 Republican National
Convention Speech, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2016, 1:34 AM), https://www.newsweek
.com/donald-trump-full-transcript-republican-national-convention-hillaryclinton-482945 (quoting Donald Trump asserting that “[b]y ending catch-andrelease on the border, we will end the cycle of human smuggling and violence”).
Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona, POLITICO (Aug. 31,
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Then-candidate Trump also campaigned strongly against
sanctuary cities such as Chicago, Seattle, and Washington
D.C., which would not provide information to federal
authorities about individuals allegedly in the country
illegally. 6
Once elected, President Trump was unable to
successfully act on any of these campaign positions. After
Mexico refused to pay for a wall, 7 he turned to Congress. 8
Congress also refused to adequately fund the wall. 9 When he
2016,
10:54
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trumpimmigration-address-transcript-227614 (Donald Trump proclaimed that he
would “[e]nd Catch-And-Release . . . . Under my Administration, anyone who
illegally crosses the border will be detained until they are removed out of our
country.”); Sarah N. Lynch & Mica Rosenberg, U.S. Attorney General Reviews
Calls to Prosecute First-Time Border Crossers, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2018, 4:59 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration/u-s-attorney-generalrenews-calls-to-prosecute-first-time-border-crossers-idUSKCN1HD2VM
(“Ending ‘catch and release’ was one of Trump’s central promises during the 2016
campaign, but immigration authorities have faced a shortage of space to house
people who have been detained.”).
6. See Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona, supra note
5 (Then-candidate Donald Trump promised, “We will end the Sanctuary Cities
that have resulted in so many needless deaths. Cities that refuse to cooperate
with federal authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars, and we will work with
Congress to pass legislation to protect those jurisdictions that do assist federal
authorities.”). See generally Michelle Ye Hee Lee, What Exactly Are ‘Sanctuary
Cities’ in Immigration Policy?, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/07/what-exactly-are-sanctuary-citiesin-immigration-policy; Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary
Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1704–05 (2018) (offering a comprehensive analysis
of the Trump administration’s immigration policies and examining its campaign
to ‘crack down’ on sanctuary cities).
7. See Louis Nelson, Mexico to Trump: We Won’t Pay for a Border Wall Under
Any Circumstances,’ POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:10 AM), https://www
.politico.com/story/2017/08/28/trump-border-wall-mexico-responds-242084
(including a statement from the Mexican foreign ministry reading: “[a]s the
Mexican government has always stated, our country will not pay, under any
circumstances, for a wall or physical barrier built on US territory along the
Mexican border”).
8. See Tal Kopan, Trump Asks for $33B for Border, Including $18B for Wall,
CNN (Jan. 6, 2018, 5:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/politics/bordersecurity-billions-trump-wall/index.html (quoting a White House official, “the
border wall needs to be fully funded by Congress”).
9. See Philip Rucker et al., Trump Threatens Again to Shut Down Federal
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sought comprehensive immigration reform to include
additional resources to patrol the border, Congress again
rejected such legislation. 10 His Executive Order attempting
to end sanctuary cities by eliminating all federal grants for
sanctuary localities was then struck down by a federal
judge. 11
Government Over Border-Wall Funding, WASH. POST (July 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-threatens-again-to-shut-downfederal-government-over-border-wall-funding/2018/07/29/a8795546-9333-11e8810c-5fa705927d54_story.html (“The president has not received from Congress
as much funding as he has requested for his proposed wall along the Mexican
border.”); Bob Bryan, Congress’ Massive New Spending Bill Completely Whiffed
on Trump’s Demands for ‘The Wall,’ BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:29 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-wall-funding-for-mexico-border-inspending-bill-2018-3 (“The massive $1.3 trillion omnibus bill does not include
funding for what Trump typically refers to as the ‘Wall.’ Instead, the bill includes
just under $1.6 billion for increased border security.”).
10. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jul 5. 2018, 10:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1014873774003556354 [https://web
.archive.org/web/20180705142841/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1
014873774003556354] (stating “Congress must pass smart, fast and reasonable
immigration laws now”); see also Jacob Pramuk, House Overwhelmingly Rejects
Latest Republican Immigration Bill After Last-Ditch Trump Push for Support,
CNBC (June 27, 2018, 1:51 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/27/house-rejectslatest-republican-immigration-bill.html. But see Mike DeBonis, House Passes
Bills to Crack Down on ‘Sanctuary Cities’ and Deported Criminals Who Return to
U.S., WASH. POST (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost
/house-passes-bills-to-crack-down-on-sanctuary-cities-and-deported-criminalswho-return-to-us/2017/06/29/f65419c4-5cff-11e7-9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html
(“The House on Thursday passed two hard-line immigration bills that would
penalize illegal immigrants who commit crimes and local jurisdictions that refuse
to work with federal authorities to deport them.”); Ira Mehlman, Senate Has No
Excuse for Ignoring the Public’s Will to Deport Criminal Aliens, THE HILL (Sept.
7, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/349601senate-has-no-excuses-for-ignoring-the-publics-will-on (criticizing the Senate for
not voting on the above referenced bills passed by the House).
11. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“In
furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary, in their
discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions
that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are
not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law
enforcement purposes . . . .”); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497,
508 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress,
not the President, so the Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on
federal funds.”); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D.
Cal. 2017) (granting summary judgment in favor of Santa Clara and enjoining
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In most of these instances, President Trump turned to
the military to fulfill his policy objectives. He utilized the
National Guard to patrol the border, 12 military lawyers to
prosecute alleged illegal immigrants in federal court, 13 and
the portion of the Executive Order the prevents sanctuary cities from receiving
federal funding); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018),
vacated No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The founders of our
country well understood that the concentration of power threatens individual
liberty and established a bulwark against such tyranny by creating a separation
of powers among the branches of government. If the Executive Branch can
determine policy, and then use the power of the purse to mandate compliance
with that policy by the state and local governments, all without the authorization
or even acquiescence of elected legislators, that check against tyranny is
forsaken. The Attorney General in this case used the sword of federal funding to
conscript state and local authorities to aid in federal civil immigration
enforcement. But the power of the purse rests with Congress, which authorized
the federal funds at issue and did not impose any immigration enforcement
conditions on the receipt of such funds.”).
12. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Katie Rogers, Trump Will Work with Governors
to Deploy National Guard to the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/trump-governors-nationalguard-border-mexico.html (President Trump stated, “We are going to be guarding
our border with our military.” The article also notes that “the White House said
Mr. Trump had been referring to mobilizing the National Guard, a step that
previous presidents have taken to support border enforcement.”); Rose L. Thayer,
National Guard Troops to Stay on Border for Another Year, STARS & STRIPES
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.stripes.com/news/us/national-guard-troops-to-stayon-border-for-another-year-1.545308 (“National Guard personnel are authorized
to remain on the U.S.-Mexico border for another year, the Defense Department
confirmed . . . . The authorization allows for up to 4,000 soldiers to serve with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents through Sept. 30, 2019 . . . .”).
Notably, the military members sent to patrol the border are members of the
National Guard and not active duty military. The National Guard members
deployed to the border are in federal title 32 status, meaning that they are under
the command and control of their governor rather than the president, although
the federal government finances the operation. See 32 U.S.C. §§ 901–907; Manny
Fernandez, National Guard Has Eyes on the Border. But They’re Not Watching
Mexico., N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/05/15/us/national-guard-texas-mexico.html.
13. See Alex Johnson & Courtney Kube, Pentagon Sending Military Lawyers
to Border to Help Prosecute Immigration Cases, NBC NEWS (June 21, 2018, 11:10
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/pentagonsending-military-lawyers-border-help-prosecute-immigration-cases-n885216
(“Twenty-one military lawyers are being sent to Arizona, Texas and New Mexico
to help prosecute illegal immigration cases . . . . The lawyers, who are to have
‘criminal trial experience,’ will be appointed as full time special U.S. attorneys
for up to 179 days, or around six months, the Defense Department said in
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military installations and resources to house detained
immigrants. 14 His rhetoric turned into action when he
exercised his authority under the National Emergencies Act
to declare a state of national emergency at the border. 15 By
doing so, President Trump attempted to unlock a series of
statutory authorities that would allow his administration to
divert congressionally authorized funds, resources, and
personnel away from the military and towards border
security, culminating in the building of the wall. 16 Once
again, though, Congress rejected President Trump’s border
security policy objective by terminating his declaration of a

confirming the plan.”).
14. W.J. Hennigan & Philip Elliott, Two Military Bases in Texas Set to House
Thousands of Migrants, TIME (June 25, 2018, 12:31 PM), http://time.com/5321083
/military-bases-house-migrants/ (“The Defense Department has been directed to
build short-term detention camps on two U.S. military bases in Texas . . . .”);
Philip Elliott & W.J. Hennigan, Exclusive: Navy Document Shows Plan to Erect
‘Austere’ Detention Camps, TIME (June 22, 2018, 2:31 PM), http://time.com
/5319334/navy-detainment-centers-zerol-tolerance-immigration-familyseparation-policy/ (“The U.S. Navy is preparing plans to construct sprawling
detention centers for tens of thousands of immigrants on remote bases in
California, Alabama and Arizona, escalating the military’s task in implementing
President Donald Trump’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy for people caught crossing the
Southern border . . . .”); Jay Croft & Barbara Starr, Military Bases Could House
Up to 20,000 Undocumented Immigrant Children, CNN (June 22, 2018, 11:45
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/22/politics/military-bases-undocumentedimmigrant-children/index.html (“The Department of Health and Human Services
has assessed three bases in Texas . . . . The bases could be used as housing within
a month if the pace of border crossing continues and no other solution is found
. . . .”).
15. Proclamation No. 9,844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,949 (Feb. 20, 2019) (relying upon
50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651). See generally Jessica Taylor & Brian Naylor, As Trump
Declares National Emergency to Fund Border Wall, Democrats Promise a Fight,
NPR (Feb. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/15/695012728
/trump-expected-to-declare-national-emergency-to-help-fund-southern-borderwall.
16. See Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 YALE L.J.F. 590, 594
(2020); see also Senator Chris Murphy, National Security Is Stronger When
Congress Is Involved. Here’s How We Get Back to the Table., WAR ON THE ROCKS
(July
20,
2021),
https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/national-security-isstronger-when-congress-is-involved-heres-how-we-get-back-to-the-table (“There
are at least 123 statutory powers that become available to the president when he
declares a national emergency . . . .”).
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national emergency. 17 Undeterred, President Trump vetoed
Congress’ termination action. 18 The national emergency
declaration remained, and President Trump succeeded in his
policy objectives, buoyed by military funding and personnel
despite repeated rejections by Congress and the judiciary.
And what if sanctuary cities continued to refuse to
provide federal law enforcement information on alleged
illegal immigrants in their jurisdiction? 19 Would President
Trump have been able to declare a state of national
emergency or an insurrection and deploy the United States
Army to seize control of those cities from democratically
elected mayors? 20 Could he have then used the military at
his disposal to refuse to leave office at the end of his term? 21
17. See Patricia Zengerle, U.S. House Votes Again to End Trump’s Border
Emergency Declaration, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-trump-congress-emergency/u-s-house-votes-again-to-endtrumps-border-emergency-declaration-idUSKBN1WC1S7.
18. Lauren Egan, Trump Issues First Veto, Rejecting Measure to Overturn
Border
Declaration,
NBC
NEWS
(Mar.
15,
2019,
3:52
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-issues-first-veto-rejectingmeasure-overturn-border-declaration-n983676.
19. See, e.g., Adam K. Raymond, Acting ICE Director Wants to Arrest
Politicians Running Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 3, 2018),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/acting-ice-director-wants-to-arrestpols-in-sanctuary-cities.html (Acting ICE Director Thomas Homan stated, “We’ve
got to take these sanctuary cities on. We’ve got to take them to court and we’ve
got to start charging some of these politicians with crimes.”).
20. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Could Trump and Sessions Send
Federal Troops to California Over Immigration?, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2018, 3:15
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/03/13/trump-sessions-mightsend-federal-troops-california-immigration-laws-glenn-reynolds-column/417633
002/; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Yes, Trump Can Invoke the Insurrection Act to
Deport Immigrants, ATLANTIC (May 17, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas
/archive/2019/05/can-trump-use-insurrection-act-stop-immigration/589690/
(highlighting that under the Insurrection Act, “if the president determines that
ordinary law enforcement is inadequate to enforce federal law, he can deploy the
military to assist”).
21. See, e.g., Nicholas Reimann, Trump Reportedly Asked Advisors About
Deploying Military to Overturn Election, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2020, 5:11 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/12/19/trump-reportedlyasked-advisors-about-deploying-military-to-overturn-election/
(“President
Donald Trump reportedly inquired about an idea raised by his former (and now
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How did the United States, purportedly built upon the
premise of separation of powers, get to the point where a
President may exercise potentially uncheckable authority to
utilize military power to achieve policy objectives rejected
throughout the constitutional design? Perhaps even more
alarming, is the threat of the President using his military
power to actively impose presidential rule upon a
democratically elected entity, whether that be at the local,
state, or federal level, more of a possibility today than it has
been since Reconstruction?
This Article explores these questions through the lens of
a potential “presidential coup.” While legal scholarship
regularly examines the role and influence of the presidency
in foreign affairs and national security matters, it seldom
takes seriously the threat of a domestic presidential coup. 22
Such a reluctance to engage with the possibility of a
presidential coup is understandable, as little historical
evidence suggested a President was likely to turn his
pardoned) national security adviser, Michael Flynn, that the U.S. military be
deployed to overturn the results of the presidential election . . . .”); see also Reis
Thebault, Joint Chiefs Chairman Feared Potential ‘Reichstag Moment’ Aimed at
Keeping Trump in Power, WASH. POST (July 15, 2021, 8:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/joint-chiefs-chairman-feared-potentialreichstag-moment-aimed-at-keeping-trump-in-power/2021/07/14/a326f5fe-e4ec11eb-a41e-c8442c213fa8_story.html (In the wake of President Trump’s electoral
defeat, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs “began informally planning with other
military leaders, strategizing how they would block Trump’s order to use the
military in a way they deemed dangerous or illegal. . . . [The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs] played reassuring soothsayer to a string of concerned members of
Congress and administration officials who shared his worries about Trump
attempting to use the military to stay in office.”).
22. But see Tsai, supra note 16, at 592–95; Stephen I. Vladeck, The Separation
of National Security Powers: Lessons from the Second Congress, 129 YALE L.J.F.
610, 610–13 (2020). While both Professor Tsai and Professor Vladeck identify the
statutory means by which the President may abuse the military power at his
disposal, they both neglect to place these authorities in the broader context of a
presidential coup. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion
of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 357–61, 386
(1994) (recognizing the potential for a future coup, but the analysis rests on the
threat of a military coup performed independently of the president, rather than
a presidential coup that utilizes the military to achieve the President’s intentions
of staging a coup).
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military power against the American people. Nonetheless,
the increasing use of the military by the Trump
Administration to circumvent the constitutional design,
followed by President Trump’s flirtation with the
Insurrection Act to use the military to quell the Black Lives
Matters Protest in Washington, D.C., 23 and then the
President’s failure to use the military to defend the U.S.
Capitol during the January 2021 insurrection 24 suggest that
such a threat of a presidential coup is ever-growing and
becoming increasingly realistic. 25 President Trump made
clear that to effectuate a presidential coup and remain in
power at the expiration of his term, he would need the
military, asking senior military leadership if they were ready
to do so. 26 Thus, legal scholarship needs to engage in the
potential of a President using the military to wage a
presidential coup with seriousness, examining its risk, the
means to protect against it, and whether those means are
functioning.
This Article presents a novel framework to do just that.
It begins with an understanding that there are two types of
presidential coups: an explicit coup where he refuses to leave
office and subordinates and compels actions by elected
23. See Rosa Brooks, Trump Wants to Crush Black Lives Matter With a Law
That Fought Segregation, WASH. POST (June 2, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/outlook/2020/06/02/trump-military-insurrection-act/; see also Scott R.
Anderson & Michel Paradis, Can Trump Use the Insurrection Act to Deploy
Troopers to American Streets?, LAWFARE (June 3, 2020, 8:47 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-trump-use-insurrection-act-deploy-troopsamerican-streets.
24. See Jan Wolfe, Trump Wanted Troops to Protect His Supporters at Jan. 6
Rally, REUTERS (May 12, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us
/congresswoman-says-trump-administration-botched-capitol-riot-preparations2021-05-12/.
25. See, e.g., Jamie Gangel & Jeremy Herb, Memo Shows Trump’s Lawyer’s
Six-Step Plan for Pence to Overturn the Election, CNN (Sept. 21, 2021, 5:39 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/20/politics/trump-pence-electionmemo/index.html.
26. See Glasser, supra note 2, (President Trump discussed the January 7,
2021 rally at the Capitol ahead of time with General Milly, telling him, “It’s gonna
be a big deal. . . . [Y]ou’re ready for that, right?”).
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officials, or an implicit coup where the President sidesteps
the constitutional design to achieve his own policy objectives.
From that understanding, it asserts the straightforward
premise that for a President to effectuate either an explicit
or implicit coup he requires the military’s power and money
to do so. And it proceeds to argue that the formal and
informal checks designed to prevent the President from
abusing his role as commander in chief to effectuate such a
coup are in a state of dysfunction. Consequently, the only
potential check on presidential abuse of the military is the
President’s own benevolent nature, leaving the environment
ripe for a future malevolent executive to use this military
power to achieve a presidential coup. 27
To support this argument, this Article proceeds in two
parts. Part I explores the primary formal check designed to
protect against presidential abuse of military power: the
constitutional separation of powers. It argues that after
generations of presidential assertions of authority over the
military, congressional acquiescence to such assertions, and
judicial abdication of checking the President’s claims, the
President may claim not only plenary constitutional
authority in utilizing the military in presidentially claimed
emergencies and insurrections, but also that such authority
is explicitly authorized by Congress and then potentially
unreviewable by the judiciary.
Part II recognizes that the breakdown of formal checks
has been present for some time, but a dysfunctional state has
been avoided through two prominent categories of informal
checks. First, the moral check—that the President will
adhere to core democratic values and refuse to abuse the
power given to him, and that the military will be
constitutionally faithful and refuse any presidential order
that amounts to a coup. Second, the political check—that an
27. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866) (“This nation,
as experience has proved, cannot always remain at peace, and has no right to
expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the
principles of the Constitution.”).
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intra-executive branch separation of powers exists that will
prevent the President from having the ability to execute a
presidential coup, and that public opinion would prevent the
President from abusing the military power entrusted to him.
But the growth and acceptance of the unitary executive and
the norm-shattering Trump presidency have severely
endangered these informal checks, making the United States
ripe for a malevolent President to execute a presidential
coup.
I. THE FORMAL CHECK:
CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
The underlying premise of this Article is that in order to
stage a coup, the President requires the support, resources,
and power of the federal military. At the same time, however,
the Constitution grants the President broad constitutional
authority over the federal military. 28 Thus arise the primary
questions of this Part: What formal legal checks exist to
prevent the President from using the military to stage a
presidential coup? And are these legal, formal checks
functioning?
This Part answers the first question by asserting that
the primary formal check is the constitutional separation of
powers. This check diffuses control of military power to the
three branches of government with substantial, co-equal
authority shared amongst the executive and legislative
branches. It then answers the second question by asserting
that this formal, legal check is in a state of dysfunction for
three primary reasons: (1) generations of Presidents
successfully asserting plenary authority to determine
national security threats or national emergencies and the
authority to respond with military force; (2) congressional
acquiescence to such assertions by delegating large swaths
of its authority to the President, implicitly and explicitly
28. See John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A
Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 609–12 (2011).
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authorizing the President to declare national emergencies
and threats and to respond with military power; and (3) the
judiciary’s abdication of its responsibility to review these
presidential assertions and congressional acquiescence,
which in turn allows for the President to claim larger swaths
of authority to utilize the federal military domestically. This
Part then concludes by addressing the significance of this
state of dysfunction—not only are there minimal formal
checks against the President utilizing the military, but the
current state of dysfunction may even give him the legal
authority to do so to effectuate a coup.
A. Establishing of the Formal Check of Separation of
Powers
The Framers were well-aware of the dangers posed by
military power. 29 Arising from the historical examples of
Rome 30 and the British monarchs, 31 as well as from their
experiences as colonists, 32 they feared a powerful standing
army would be a threat to both liberty and to the nascent
republic. 33 The risks posed by a standing army were two-fold:

29. See Anthony J. Ghiotto, Defending Against the Military: The Posse
Comitatus Act’s Exclusionary Rule, 11 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 359, 371–76 (2020).
30. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 257 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“[T]he liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military
triumphs . . . .”).
31. See David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
477, 515 (2008); Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 16–17 (2002); cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 62 (1849) (Woodbury,
J., dissenting) (“[I]n every country which makes any claim to political or civil
liberty, ‘martial law,’ as here attempted and as once practised in England against
her own people, has been expressly forbidden there for near two centuries, as well
as by the principles of every other free constitutional government. And it would
be not a little extraordinary, if the spirit of our institutions, both State and
national, was not much stronger than in England against the unlimited exercise
of martial law over a whole people. . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
32. See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
181, 184 (1962) (“Our War of the Revolution was, in good measure, fought as a
protest against standing armies.”); see also Turley, supra note 31, at 15–17.
33. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of
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first, the army itself would conspire to overthrow the
republic, 34 or second, the branch of government given control
of the army would use the military to subordinate the other
branches, and potentially the republic as well. 35
To protect against both these threats, the Founders
placed the federal army under the control of a civilian—the
President as the commander in chief 36—but also subjected
this control to the constitutional separation of powers. 37 As
noted by Chief Justice John Roberts, “The Framers’ inherent
distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind
Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 857 (2012) (arguing that to the framers, the presence
of standing army “would undermine particular constitutional values, including
the protection of individual rights and the maintenance of a noncorrupt,
politically accountable system of government”); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 18
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The alarm was sounded in the Constitutional
Convention about the danger of the armed services. Luther Martin of Maryland
said, ‘[W]hen a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce
them to slavery, it generally makes use of standing army.’”).
34. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1957) (“The tradition of keeping the
military subordinate to civilian authority may not be so strong in the minds of
this generation as it was in the minds of those who wrote the Constitution. . . .
The Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous
to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in
history. They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military
leaders.”); see also Perpich v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990) (“[T]here
was a widespread fear that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat
to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate States . . . .”).
35. See Luban, supra note 31, at 518–19 (quoting Centinel II, To the People of
Pennsylvania, INDEP. GAZETEER (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT 58, 58–59 (David E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995)) (“The fear that
a standing army would empower a tyrant appears again and again in the
ratification debates over the new Constitution. . . . ‘A standing army with regular
provision of pay and contingencies, would afford a strong temptation to some
ambitious man to step up into the throne, and to seize absolute power.’”); see also
Ghiotto, supra note 29, at 374–75.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see Luban, supra note 31, at 530 (“The
fundamental point was that, given the need for civilian control of the military,
the choice of making the president commander in chief prevailed because it was
universally regarded as better than the alternatives of making Congress the
commander in chief or having multiple commanders in chief.”).
37. See Turley, supra note 31, at 22 (“[T]he Framers closely associated
unchecked authority over standing armies with the excesses of the British
Crown. The division of power in the Madisonian system alleviated this concern
to some degree.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three
independent branches. This design serves not only to make
Government accountable but also to secure individual
liberty.” 38
As the federal army posed potentially the greatest risk
to liberty, the Framers allocated powers over the military to
the different branches of government. 39 The Constitution
enumerates several powers to the President that can be used
in asserting control of the federal military: first, that “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in” the President; 40 second,
that the President is commander in chief of the federal
military; 41 and third, that the President “shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” 42 But the Constitution also
allocates substantial authority to Congress in controlling
military power. 43 Namely, the Constitution gives Congress
the powers to provide for the common defense, to declare war,
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces, to raise and support armies, and to “provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,

38. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); see Wellness Int’l Network
v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 695 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (positing that the
separation of powers “promotes both liberty and accountability”); cf. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty . . . .”); Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Liberty is
always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the
separation of powers.”).
39. See Turley, supra note 31, at 22.
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
43. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (Chief Justice
Marshall noting that Congress holds the “whole powers of war”); see also Jules
Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent
Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 395 (2008) (“Congressional
power over warfare also seems logically limitless, and the Constitution seems to
provide Congress with substantial power to check virtually all the President’s
Commander in Chief powers.”).
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suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.” 44
And while the Constitution is silent on the judiciary’s
allocated powers relative to the federal military, the United
States Supreme Court has long recognized the judiciary’s
role in reviewing both the Executive and congressional use
of military power. 45 For instance, in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
the Supreme Court considered the then-territorial governor’s
imposition of martial law in World War II Hawaii, which
subjected two citizens to trial by military tribunal. 46
Considering whether a congressional act intended such use
of the military in domestic matters, the Court noted that
“[p]eople of many ages and countries have feared and
unflinchingly opposed the kind of subordination of executive,
legislative and judicial authorities to complete military
rule . . . . In this country that fear has become part of our
cultural and political institutions.” 47 Consequently, the
Court affirmed that “[c]ourts and their procedural
safeguards are indispensable to our system of government.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
45. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123–24 (1866) (“When
peace prevails, and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no
difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty; for the ordinary modes of trial
are never neglected . . . but if society is disturbed by civil commotion . . . these
safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted with
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws.”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19
(1942) (where the Court considered whether the executive branch had the legal
authority to try Quirin in a military tribunal because “[i]n view of the public
importance of the questions raised by their petitions and of the duty which rests
on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired
the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the
public interest required that we consider and decide those questions without any
avoidable delay”); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the President, we would be
expanding Article II of the Constitution and rewriting it to suit the political
conveniences of the present emergency.”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–16
(1972) (“[W]hen presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting
from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully
empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury . . . .”).
46. See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 309–12.
47. Id. at 319.
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They were set up by our founders to protect the liberties they
valued.” 48
This shared responsibility over the military among the
branches of government purports to provide a formal check
against each branch’s potential abuse of military power to
stage a coup. These formal checks are most evident in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 49 In Youngstown,
the United States Supreme Court considered President
Truman’s seizure of steel mills without congressional
authorization. 50 To justify this action, the Truman
Administration argued the seizure was a matter of national
security. Truman claimed he was acting consistently with his
constitutional authority as commander in chief and as the
Executive of the United States. 51
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. 52 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Jackson explained the shared
authority between Congress and the executive branch in
matters of national security. 53 He highlighted that “[t]he
purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but
to keep it from getting out of hand.” 54 Turning his attention
to President Truman’s claim that his constitutional
authority as commander in chief afforded him the power to
seize the steel mills, Justice Jackson stated:
Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a
war is entrusted only to Congress. . . . [N]o doctrine that the Court
could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming
48. Id. at 322.
49. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2314 (2006) (referring to Justice Jackson’s
concurring opinion as “the most celebrated judicial opinion of the separation-ofpowers canon”); Kristen E. Eichenseher, The Youngstown Canon: Vetoed Bills
and the Separation of Powers, 70 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1249–55 (2021).
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582–83.
51. Id. at 640–46 (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 588–89 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 640.
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than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his
mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture. 55

Justice Jackson also turned to the constitutional
authority of Congress to call forth the militia, noting that
this allocation of power to Congress, rather than the
President, “underscores the Constitution’s policy that
Congress, not the Executive, should control utilization of the
war power as an instrument of domestic policy.” 56
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, along with
the Court’s rejection of President Truman’s assertion of
authority, confirms the formal check against the abuse of
military authority—the constitutional separation of
powers. 57 As established by Justice Jackson’s tripartite
framework to resolve disputes over the allocation of military
authority, the use of military power is most legitimate when
the President and Congress are acting together. 58 In turn,
the presidential use of the military is at its weakest when the
President is acting in direct opposition to Congress, which in
turn affords the judiciary a higher level of scrutiny in

55. Id. at 642.
56. Id. at 644.
57. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050 (2005) (arguing that the
tripartite framework in Youngstown has been “widely accepted”); see also Neal
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002) (Justice Jackson’s concurrence
provides the “three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of
separation of powers.”). But see Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against
the View that Jackson’s Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and
the Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1709 (2007) (arguing that
Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework does not provide clear guidance to settle
disputes between Congress and the President as commander in chief).
58. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
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reviewing the presidential action. 59
Thus, in the context of a presidential coup, should the
President use military authority without congressional
approval (or in direct opposition to it) to act, the judiciary
would have the ability to review and invalidate such conduct.
Similarly, should the President begin to assert this
authority, Congress could explicitly invalidate such use
through its constitutional authority over the military.
Nonetheless, for a formal check to protect against potential
abuse of military power, Congress and the judiciary must
exercise their constitutional authorities. The following Part
argues that Congress and the judiciary are unable to assert
their own constitutional authority relative to the use of
military force because Congress continues to authorize and
acquiesce to broader assertions of presidential authority in
this realm, and the courts continue to abdicate their role in
meaningfully reviewing these assertions.
B. The First Breakdown of the Separation of Powers:
Presidential Assertion of Plenary Power
Scholars frequently discuss the President’s plenary
power in national security matters. 60 However, much of the
scholarship focuses on the President’s plenary power in
foreign matters: whether the President can initiate a war,
and whether the President has sole authority in how war will

59. Id. at 637–38 (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject.”).
60. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 1, 68 (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 11–12 (2007); JOHN
YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH, at xiv–xv (2009); David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional
History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946 (2008).
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be conducted. 61 Scholars have engaged less with the
President’s use of the military in domestic matters. 62 But it
is this authority—domestic use of the military—that invokes
the risk and potential of a presidential coup. What if a
President claims there is a national emergency, an
insurrection, or a crisis? Can he then use the military power
at his authority domestically to quell the threat? And can
these determinations—the presence of a crisis, national
emergency, or insurrection, and whether the use of military
force is necessary in response—be reviewed by either
Congress or the judiciary?
The constitutional separation of powers and the
Youngstown framework seems to answer these questions. 63
Congress and the President appear to share concurrent
authority over military power, which is seemingly and
especially true in the domestic use of the military. 64 Yet,
Presidents often assert the plenary authority to identify and
respond to national security threats. 65 And these national
security threats often involve domestic disturbances, such as
61. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign
Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 528 (1999);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234–35 (2001); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of
Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 262–63 (2009); Louis Fisher, Presidential
Residual Power in Foreign Affairs, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 491, 492 (2019).
62. But cf. ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN
DOMESTIC DISORDERS 1789–1878, at 31–40 (1988); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,
Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 357–61 (1994); Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency
Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 168–83 (2004).
63. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice
Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy
Combatants,” 68 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2005).
64. See John C. Dehn, War Is More Than a Political Question: Reestablishing
Original Constitutional Norms, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 501–02 (2019); see also
Cleveland, supra note 63, at 1128–29.
65. See Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief:
Congress’s Authority to Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations, 13
GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 183–84 (2004).
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national emergencies or potential insurrections. 66 When
responding to these presidential assertions, the judiciary
then appears to be accepting of such plenary authority, thus
emboldening the President in both declaring a national
security threat and then electing to respond to the threat
through military power. 67
This claim of presidential authority—supported by the
judiciary—arose with vigor during the Civil War and
President Lincoln’s assertion of plenary powers in
responding to Southern secession. As noted by Saikrishna
Prakash, prior to the Civil War, Presidents were largely
“impotent” in dealing with emergencies as the Constitution
“fashioned something of an imbecilic emergency executive,
one lacking constitutional authority to take property,
suspend habeas corpus, or impose military rule.” 68 Instead,
Presidents were left to summon Congress and request forces,
funding, and legislation for any potential suspension of civil
liberties. 69
President Lincoln, however, challenged and changed the
narrative from one of an “imbecilic Executive” to one
“virtually omnipotent” in identifying and responding to

66. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Tara
M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, Note, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program:
An Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 149 (2006); Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful
Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions,
Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
345, 394–96.
67. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670
(1863) (where the scope and scale of the nation’s response to the Southern
rebellion was “a question to be decided by [the Executive], and this Court must
be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted”); see also Rebecca A. D’Arcy,
Note, The Legacy of Dames & Moore v. Regan: The Twilight Zone of Concurrent
Authority Between the Executive and Congress and a Proposal for a Judicially
Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2003).
68. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV.
1361, 1365 (2013).
69. Id. at 1367.
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national security threats. 70 He first asserted such authority
in what has come to be known as the Prize Cases. 71 At the
outset of the Civil War, President Lincoln ordered the
blockade of Southern ports. 72 Pursuant to this blockade
order, Union forces seized several ships and sold the ships
and their cargo. 73 President Lincoln claimed the authority to
issue such an order from his plenary constitutional powers,
specifically, his authority as the commander in chief, his
responsibility to execute the laws of the United States, and
his oath to execute the presidential office. 74
In considering the legality of this order and President
Lincoln’s assertions, the Supreme Court ultimately decided
the legality of the Civil War itself. The Court was unanimous
“that the president had the right to mobilize the nation to do
battle after Sumter, and that an actual state of war
existed.” 75 But the Court was divided as to whether
President Lincoln had the authority to engage in battle
without congressional authorization. By a 5–4 vote, the
Court held:
The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive
power. . . . If a war be made . . . , the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate
the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for
any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile part be a
foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less

70. Id. at 1368, 1418.
71. See Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil
War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2010) (“Enemy vessels or cargo seized
validly under the international laws of war were referred to as ‘prizes’ of war,
because they generally accrued to the financial benefit of the captors—hence the
‘Prize Cases.’”).
72. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 144–45 (2012).
73. Id. at 147.
74. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation by the President of the United States of
America on Blockade of Confederate Ports (Apr. 19, 1861), LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/lprbscsm.scsm0582/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
75. DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 141 (2003).
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a war . . . .” 76

Significantly, the Court affirmed that President Lincoln
had authority to issue the blockade under his plenary
constitutional powers. 77 Although President Lincoln did not
view the Civil War as two separate nations in conflict, the
Court determined that regardless of what name one chose to
“baptize” the hostilities with, a war existed de facto. 78 From
there, the President’s commander in chief and executive
powers flowed.
The Court then affirmed that the President alone, once
confronted with the insurrection of the Southern states, had
the sole constitutional authority to determine the
appropriate response. As the Court phrased it, the scope and
scale of the nation’s response was “a question to be decided
by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions
and acts of the political department of the Government to
which this power was entrusted.” 79 It is important to note at
this juncture that the Court used the singular form when
referring to the constitutional power to make these decisions,
and that this power resided in only one branch of
government: the executive.
President Lincoln then made similar assertions of
plenary authority in his suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. Beginning first under the State Department and
then eventually under the War Department, the Lincoln
Administration used the military to imprison thousands of
civilians. 80 Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, acting with the
approval of President Lincoln, allowed for arrested
76. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668
(1863) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 666.
78. Id. at 669 (“The President was bound to meet [war] in the shape it
presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no
name given to it by him or them could change the fact.”).
79. Id. at 670.
80. FARBER, supra note 75, at 157.
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individuals to be detained indefinitely and without judicial
hearings by suspending the writ of habeas corpus. 81
In May 1861, Union forces arrested and detained John
Merryman, under suspicion that he was an officer of prosecession citizens who conspired to destroy bridges and
railway lines throughout Maryland. 82 Merryman challenged
his detainment and the President’s suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. 83 Chief Justice Roger Taney agreed with
Merryman, finding that President Lincoln lacked the
plenary power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 84 He
noted that “the president has exercised a power which he
does not possess under the [C]onstitution,” and that the
executive clause did not grant him such authority as
[h]e is not authorized to execute them himself, or through agents or
officers, civil or military, appointed by himself, but he is to take care
that they be faithfully carried into execution, as they are expounded
and adjudged by the co-ordinate branch of the government to which
that duty is assigned by the constitution. 85

Chief Justice Taney’s decision failed to persuade
President Lincoln that he lacked the plenary power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 86 In a special address to
Congress following the decision, President Lincoln asserted
his plenary power to address national emergencies:
The provision of the Constitution that “the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it” is . . . a
81. Id.
82. Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and
Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 485–87 (2016).
83. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–48 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
84. Id. at 148–49.
85. Id.
86. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 95 (1993)
(“Lincoln simply offered a rebuttal to Taney’s position on the merits of the
suspension clause question . . . . But the plain implication of Lincoln’s actions is
that he believed the President need not enforce such a judgment.”).
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provision . . . that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was
decided that we have a case of rebellion and that the public safety
does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ
which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress,
and not the Executive, is vested with this power; but the
Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the
power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous
emergency . . . . 87

President Lincoln’s assertion—made in direct response
to Chief Justice Taney’s decision—is significant. He
recognized that when a determination is made that the
country is in a state of rebellion or invasion, an emergency
constitution is unlocked that allows for certain powers, such
as suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Implicit in
President Lincoln’s assertion is that the President makes the
determination that nation is in a state of rebellion and it is
then the President that gets to decide what powers the
emergency constitution unlocks. 88 Such assertions of
authority did not end with President Lincoln. 89 Prakash
87. President Abraham Lincoln, July 4th Message to Congress (July 4, 1861),
UNIV. OF VA.: MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presi
dential-speeches/july-4-1861-july-4th-message-congress (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
88. See FARBER, supra note 75, at 159 (Professor Farber discusses a memo
from Attorney General Bates that upheld the President’s power to suspend the
writ, arguing that “under the oath clause as well as the militia act, the president
was required to suppress insurrections by use of the militia, the army, and the
navy. He must use his discretion in meeting the threat.”).
89. The last four administrations have made similar claims of plenary
presidential authority. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37–38
(D.D.C. 1999) (Despite having Congressional authorization to launch air strikes
in Yugoslavia, President Clinton stated in his communications with Congress, “I
have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”); Deployment
of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 173 (1994);
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal
Couns., to Alberto Gonzales, Couns. to the President, on Authority for Use of
Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23,
2001),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo
militaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns. to Robert J. Delahunty, Special Couns.,
on The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
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highlights the significance, arguing that
Lincoln’s measures clearly were successful in further altering the
terms of the constitutional debate. . . . [H]is bold, unilateral actions
and the justness of his cause supply fertile ground for broad and
vigorous executive power in times of emergency until this day. Any
executive who wishes to act expeditiously and unilaterally in times
of emergency can now cite Lincoln and attempt to ride his long
constitutional coattails. 90

This presidential assertion of plenary authority in
recognizing domestic threats and utilizing the military to
respond is especially empowering in terms of executive
authority when placed in the Youngstown framework. For
instance, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the President and Congress
were in direct opposition, with the President refusing to
allow United States citizens born in Jerusalem to have
“Israel” listed as their place of birth on their United States
passport, while Congress passed legislation explicitly
allowing them to do so. 91
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/file/19151/download; Authority to Use Military Force in
Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 20, 27 (2011) (“[W]e believe that . . . the President had
constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and
pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations
abroad, even without prior specific congressional approval.”); Targeted Airstrikes
Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 38 Op. O.L.C. 82, 82 (2014)
(“[T]he President had the constitutional authority to order these military
operations because he had reasonably determined that they would further
sufficiently important national interests, and because their anticipated nature,
scope, and duration were sufficiently limited that prior congressional approval
was not constitutionally required.”); April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian
Chemical-Weapons Facilities, slip op. at 1 (May 31, 2018), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2018/05/31/2018-05-31-syrianairstrikes_1.pdf (“Before the strikes occurred, we advised that the President
could lawfully direct them because he had reasonably determined that the use of
force would be in the national interest and that the anticipated hostilities would
not rise to the level of a war in the constitutional sense.”); Memorandum from
Steven A. Engel, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., to John A. Eisenberg,
Legal Advisor to the Nat’l Sec. Council, on January 2020 Airstrike in Iraq Against
Qassem Soleimani (Mar. 10, 2020), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents
/21012045/redacted-olc-memo-justification-of-soleimani-strike.pdf.
90. Prakash, supra note 68, at 1417.
91. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 5–8 (2015).
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Recognizing this case resided in the third-tier of the
Youngstown framework, the Court still determined that as a
matter of constitutional design and practical necessity, the
President alone had the plenary responsibility for
recognition of foreign countries. 92 As such, “[t]he formal act
of recognition is an executive power that Congress may not
qualify.” 93 Thus, under Zivotofsky, if courts agree with the
President’s assertion of plenary authority to declare a state
of national emergency or insurrection and to use military
force to respond to such a threat, then the action will survive
judicial scrutiny under Youngstown. This is true even if the
action taken is without congressional authorization or with
explicit congressional disapproval. 94
The result of these presidential assertions is that

92. Id. at 14–15 (“The Constitution thus assigns the President means to effect
recognition on his own initiative. Congress, by contrast, has no constitutional
power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation.
Because these specific Clauses confer the recognition power on the President, the
Court need not consider whether or to what extent the Vesting Clause, which
provides that the ‘executive Power’ shall be vested in the President, provides
further support for the President’s action here.”).
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 80 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court’s reasoning will
“systematically favor the unitary President over the plural Congress in disputes
involving foreign affairs. . . . It is certain that, in the long run, it will erode the
structure of separated powers that the People established for the protection of
their liberty.”); see also, Jack Goldsmith, The Supreme Court 2014 Term–
Comment: Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV.
112, 134 (2015) (“To say that Zivotofsky II lacks predictable consequences in the
judiciary is not to say that it lacks predictable consequences on presidential
power. It will have such consequences in the executive branch, which operates
under very different principles and incentives than the judiciary. Unlike judges,
executive branch lawyers have an institutional predilection to read presidential
power broadly. They will accordingly tend to construe Zivotofsky II’s holding,
dicta, and ambiguities in the President’s favor.”); Michael Blackburn, Note, The
Return of the King: How the Supreme Court Distorted the Jackson Concurrence
and Expanded Executive Power in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S.
Ct. 2076 (2015), 96 NEB. L. REV. 198, 220 (2017) (“The Court’s analytical flaws in
Zivotofsky also increased the Executive Branch’s power. . . . The sum of these
increases has moved the Executive Branch in the direction of the expansive
executive power wielded by King George III, the example both feared and rejected
by Justice Jackson in his famous Youngstown concurrence.”).

398

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Presidents can make a good faith claim of plenary
constitutional authority—under the Commander in Chief
and Executive Authority Clauses—that they alone have the
authority to declare a domestic national security threat, a
national emergency, or an insurrection. And in turn, they can
then assert the plenary authority to respond to this threat
using domestic military force. By claiming plenary
constitutional authority to do so, Presidents can then
potentially survive either explicit congressional opposition to
such determination or judicial scrutiny under the
Youngstown framework. Therefore, a President may
potentially legally stage a coup by finding political opponents
to be a domestic national security threat or an insurrection
and then using the military power at his disposal to suppress
the alleged threat.
C. The Second Breakdown of the Separation of Powers:
Congressional Acquiescence of Presidential Power
As Presidents claim broad plenary authority in both the
declaration of national emergencies and insurrections and
in the use of military power to respond to such declarations,
what precludes the President from using such authority to
stage a coup? Could the President fabricate a national
emergency or insurrection to justify utilizing military power
to effectuate a presidential coup? Conceivably, Congress
serves as the most effective check against the President
doing so. After all, Congress possesses its own plenary power
over national emergencies and military power, including the
power to declare war and to call “forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions.” 95
But instead of exercising this authority, Congress has
long chosen to acquiesce to the presidential assertions of
authority. 96 It has done so through repeated explicit and
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
96. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Congress’s Power over Military Officers, 99 TEX.
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implicit delegations of congressional authority to both
declare emergencies and insurrections and to govern the use
of military force in response to these declarations. 97 The
result of this acquiescence is that the President is at his most
powerful under the first tier of the Youngstown framework:
He operates with Congressional approval. And when viewed
through the lens of the Insurrection Act and National
Emergencies Act, Congress has given the President the
authority to use the military power at his disposal to stage a
presidential coup.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
Congress does have the ability to delegate authority to the
President in both domestic 98 and foreign matters. 99 While
the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States,” 100 the Court has recognized the “Congress may
‘obtain the assistance of the coordinate Branches’—and in
particular, may confer substantial discretion on executive
agencies to implement and enforce the laws.” 101 The
judiciary will allow for such a delegation of authority so long
as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise
the delegated authority is directed.” 102 And although this
interpretation of the nondelegation doctrine has come under
frequent attack regarding regulatory agencies, Congress’
ability to delegate national security authority—especially
L. REV. 491, 495 (2021).
97. See, e.g., The Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255; 50 U.S.C. § 1601–
1651.
98. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
99. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28
(1936).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
101. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372 (1989)).
102. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
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Congress’ ability to delegate authority both domestically
and in matters of national security speaks to the difficulty in
addressing the potential of a presidential coup. The terms
national “threat,” “security,” and “emergency” are often used
interchangeably and appear to be overly broad and illdefined. 104 When Congress authorizes the President to
declare a national emergency, is such an emergency a purely
domestic matter, such as a devastating storm? Or is it a
national security matter, such as border security? 105 Often,
when Congress delegates this authority and when the
President asserts this authority, there will be an intersection
of all these terms—a domestic matter that triggers national
security concerns or a foreign national security matter that
triggers domestic concerns. The Court’s interpretation of the
nondelegation doctrine—allowing Congress to delegate
authority both domestically and from a foreign affairs
perspective—allows the President and Congress to avoid
defining and clarifying these terms. 106
When Congress elects to delegate authority to the
103. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
stricter adherence to the nondelegation doctrine, but acknowledging that
Congress can delegate non-legislative responsibilities when “Congress’s
legislative authority sometimes overlaps with authority the Constitution
separately vests in another branch,” (citing among others, Curtiss-Wright, 299
U.S. at 320)); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, The National Security Delegation
Conundrum, JUST SEC. (July 17, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64946/thenational-security-delegation-conundrum/; Joseph Postell, The Nondelegation
Doctrine After Gundy, 13 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 280, 283–88 (2020).
104. See Cohen, supra note 103.
105. See, e.g., Maegan Vazquez & Priscilla Alvarez, White House Extends
National Emergency on the Southern Border, CNN (Feb. 14, 2020, 4:34 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/13/politics/southern-border-national-emergencycontinuation/index.html.
106. See Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 69 (2017)
(discussing the Obama administration’s use of the ill-defined, limitless term of
“co-belligerent” as a justification to combat new terrorist organizations in
locations other than Afghanistan under the 2001 Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force).
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President, especially if it speaks to national security
concerns, courts are likely to interpret such delegation as
congressional authorization of presidential action. 107 For
example, in Ex parte Quirin, President Roosevelt ordered
Quirin and his co-conspirators to be tried by military
commission. 108 While President Roosevelt claimed he had
the plenary authority to do so, the Court sidestepped that
issue to find that “[b]y the Articles of War, and especially
Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may
constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of
war.” 109 As such, the Court found President Roosevelt’s order
to be authorized by Congress and thus constitutional.
Similarly, the Court has shown a willingness to interpret
delegations of authority in national security matters
broadly. 110 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court affirmed just
how far broadly written statutes may affirm presidential
conduct in the realm of national security. Considering
Congress’ 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 111 the Court
noted the following:
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to “use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
107. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (In reviewing Congress’
legislation allowing the President to establish rules for granting and issuing
passports, the Court found that there was no impermissible delegation because
in areas of national security, Congress must necessarily paint with a broader
brush.).
108. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 22 (1942).
109. Id. at 28.
110. See Robert Knowles, Delegating National Security, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
1117, 1140–50 (2021) (discussing Congress’ broad delegation of national security
authority to the executive branch and the judiciary’s reluctance to review such
delegation and the executive branch’s exercise of such authority).
111. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
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organizations or persons.” 112

Importantly, there were no temporal or physical
restrictions placed on the President’s authority to act.
Congress granted him perhaps the broadest authority absent
an actual declaration of war. 113 Although the Court was
answering a “narrow question,” it made no mention that this
AUMF was unconstitutionally broad. 114
This is important considering the question that was
before the Court. Relying on the AUMF, the President
detained an American citizen in Afghanistan because he
determined the citizen was an enemy combatant. 115 The
Court affirmed the president’s power to detain enemy
combatants as a “fundamental . . . incident to war.” 116
Therefore, Congress did not need to give express
authorization so that the President could detain enemy
combatants (even if they were also American citizens); the
broad authorization included those war powers that are
“fundamental.” 117
Further, courts have held that Congress authorized
presidential action, even if the delegation of authority (or
authorization) is not explicit. 118 Consider Dames & Moore v.

112. Id.
113. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 57, at 2057–66. But cf. Cleveland,
supra note 63, at 1139.
114. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 517–18 (“[T]he AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for the
detention of individuals in the narrow category [of enemy combatant] . . . . We
conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category [of enemy
combatant], . . . is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an
exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the
President to use.”).
117. This power also extends to the military detention of American citizens
seized on U.S. soil once the President determines the citizen is an “enemy
combatant.” See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
118. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) (stating “in the areas of foreign
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Regan. 119 There, the Court considered whether two broadly
written statutes authorized the President to suspend claims
brought by Americans against Iranian companies to secure
the release of hostages taken in that country. 120 In
interpreting the two statutes at hand, the Court determined
that neither gave the President express authorization to
suspend claims. 121 However, the Court determined instead,
as a matter of legislative history, that Congress intended to
provide the President wide latitude in responding to hostage
crises—to include the suspension of claims. 122 Thus, even
where Congress has not provided express statutory authority
for any given executive action and where there is a “zone of
twilight” between the two branches of government, the
President is still empowered to respond to national security
threats where multiple statutes evince a congressional
intent to affirm a broad spectrum of available actions. 123
Taken together, the Court has not only allowed Congress
to delegate authority to the President that speaks to national
security, national threats, and national emergencies, but has
read such delegation broadly to include congressional
authorization of presidential action even when such
authorization is not explicit. 124 The Court’s acceptance of this
policy and national security . . . congressional silence is not to be equated with
congressional disapproval”); see also Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that where Congress fails to disapprove of presidential
use of military force, implicit approval is appropriate).
119. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
120. See id. at 675.
121. Id. at 675–76.
122. Id. at 677–79.
123. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1971) (stating that where there is “any action by . . . Congress sufficient to
authorize or ratify the military activity” then the courts should find the use of
force Constitutionally valid).
124. Congressional silence is even sufficient to find “approval” of Presidential
conduct in the area of national security where there is historical practice to
support the President’s conduct. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) (“[I]n the
areas of foreign policy and national security, . . . congressional silence is not to be
equated with congressional disapproval.”).
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congressional acquiescence is especially important in the
Youngstown framework. If the court determines the
President is acting with congressional authorization, he is
then at the zenith of his power. 125 And such power is then
ripe for abuse.
This state of dysfunction, caused by congressional
acquiescence, is especially problematic when viewed through
the lens of the Insurrection Act and the National
Emergencies Act. Both acts give the President broad
authority to manufacture a presidential coup, with both
supporting an argument that should the President do so, he
is acting under congressional authority and therefore under
the most powerful tier in the Youngstown framework.
1. The Insurrection Act
Under the Constitution, Congress has the plenary
authority to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions.” 126 However, Congress elected to delegate this
authority to the President in a series of statutes generally
referred to as the Insurrection Act. 127 Invoked numerous
times to quell civic unrest, 128 the act authorizes the
President to deploy active duty, guard, or reserve military
personnel domestically in three situations: (1) when a state
125. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 656; see also Haig, 453 U.S. at 291;
Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043; Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 15.
127. The Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55.
128. Since 1943, the act has been invoked twelve times. Of those twelve
invocations, seven of them involved issues of protesters-turned-rioters whereby
the President deployed military forces to enforce domestic law without the
request of a state government. President Eisenhower invoked the act once to
respond to school integration issues in Arkansas. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed.
Reg. 7,628 (Sept. 25, 1957). President Kennedy invoked the act three times to
respond to integration issues. Exec. Order No. 11,053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9,693 (Oct. 2,
1962); Exec. Order No. 11,111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5,709 (June 12, 1963); Exec. Order
No. 11,118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9,863 (Sept. 11, 1963). President Johnson invoked the
act on his own authority one time in response to the Civil Rights marches in
Alabama. Exec. Order No. 11,207, 30 Fed. Reg. 3,741 (Mar. 23, 1965).

2022]

THE PRESIDENTIAL COUP

405

governor or legislature requests it due to an insurrection
within the state; 129 (2) when the President independently
“considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United
States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States”; 130 or (3) when the President independently
determines “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy . . . hinders the execution” of
federal or state law or “impedes the course of justice under
those laws.” 131 Once the President finds one of the qualifying
conditions exist, he is then given the sole authority to
determine how to use military force. 132
More simply, through the Insurrection Act, Congress
delegated to the President the ability to make findings of fact
that unlock a significant power: deploying military forces
domestically to enforce state and federal law. 133
This congressional delegation of authority to the
President is sweeping. 134 Not only does Congress make the
President the finder of fact in both determinations—that
there is a state of insurrection, and that military force is
necessary—but also such a determination generally is
129. 10 U.S.C. § 251.
130. 10 U.S.C. § 252.
131. 10 U.S.C. § 253.
132. 10 U.S.C. § 252 (“[H]e may call into federal service such of the militia of
any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce
those laws or to suppress the rebellion.” (emphasis added)); 10 U.S.C. § 253 (“The
President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other
means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State,
any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
133. 10 U.S.C. §§ 252–253.
134. See Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive
Discretion to Use the Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1027,
1057–64 (2008); see also Vladeck, supra note 22, at 611; Steve Vladeck, Trump’s
George Floyd Protest Threats Raise Legal Question. Here’s What He Can (and
Can’t) Do., NBC NEWS (June 2, 2020, 3:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think
/opinion/trump-s-george-floyd-protest-threats-raise-legal-questions-herencna1222241.
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unreviewable. 135 Where Congress gives the President the
sole authority to make a finding of fact and includes no
standard by which a court could review the finding, the
President’s determination is final. 136
While this seems like an extreme menu of options, it is
important to remember that the President is at his zenith of
power when operating under this statutory scheme because
he has congressional authorization. The statutory language
is clear: the President may use military force when he alone
determines particular conditions are met and as he alone
determines is necessary to suppress the threat. 137
Moreover, the statutory authorization to use military
force domestically is coupled with the President’s plenary
power as commander in chief and his national security and
foreign affairs power. 138 Once the military is deployed, the
135. See, e.g., Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) (holding that
when Congress delegated to the President the authority to respond to an invasion
or an imminent invasion that the President’s exercise of such authority was
unreviewable by the judiciary); Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 95 (1874)
(finding that when Congress delegated the authority to the President to
determine which state or district was in a state of insurrection, such a
determination made by the President was then unreviewable by the judiciary).
136. See discussion infra Section I.D; see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2409 (2018) (finding that when Congress gives the President broad authority and
does not require him to justify his findings, courts should give broad deference to
the decisions made by the President).
137. In response to the Trump administration’s use of the military against
protestors in 2020, several congressional bills were proposed but never made it
to a full vote. See Curtailing Insurrection Act Violations of Individual Liberties
Act, S. 3902, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring certification to Congress that the state
requested military support or one of the conditions in the Insurrection Act
actually existed); Stop Using Military Force Against Civilians Act, H.R. 7129,
116th Cong. (2020) (proposing time limits on how long a President may deploy
military forces under the Insurrection Act before requiring congressional action);
Civil Deployment Notification Act of 2020, H.R. 7215, 116th Cong. § 2(b) (2020)
(requiring notification to Congress by the President prior to deploying military
forces domestically under the Insurrection Act).
138. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936)
(“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
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President’s choices on how to use that force, as a matter of
precedent, is unreviewable. 139 Although this is a situation
falling within the scope of an “imperfect” war, that does not
limit what the President may do with a deployed military—
even stateside—if that power is a “fundamental” incident to
war. 140
The impact of the Insurrection Act in addition to
Supreme Court precedent regarding the President’s plenary
power to direct military activities is significant. Congress
gave the President the sole authority to determine that a
state of insurrection exists and the power to deploy military
force domestically. From there, the courts have given the
President unreviewable power to employ that force however
he sees fit.

relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress . . . .”).
139. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the
court “cannot reasonably or appropriately determine whether a specific military
operation constitutes [a change] of the war or is merely a new tactical approach
within a [congressionally authorized] strategic plan”); Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F.
Supp. 3d 56, 79 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s classification as a key AQAP
leader to target by a drone strike raises fundamental questions regarding the
conduct of armed conflict. The Constitution commits decision-making in this area
to the President, as Commander in Chief, and to Congress.”); Lebron v. Rumsfeld,
670 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Constitution delegates authority over
military affairs to Congress and to the President as Commander in Chief. It
contemplates no comparable role for the judiciary. . . . [J]udicial review of
military decisions would stray from the traditional subjects of judicial
competence.”); Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 334 (S.D.N.Y
2013) (holding the decision to use a U.S. Navy ship to divert a commercial vessel
from a Libyan port was a “[m]ilitary judgment[] . . . constitutionally committed
to the Executive Branch”).
140. Once the President has statutory authorization to deploy forces
domestically, the Posse Comitatus Act no longer bars the Executive from using
military force stateside. See Ghiotto, supra note 29, at 363; see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–18 (2004) (“[T]he AUMF is explicit congressional
authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow category [of enemy
combatant] . . . . We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited
category [of enemy combatant], . . . is so fundamental and accepted an incident
to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has
authorized the President to use.”).
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2. The National Emergencies Act
Congress further delegated authority ripe for
presidential abuse via the National Emergencies Act. 141 The
National Emergencies Act allows for the President to
“unlock” additional powers in the event of a national
emergency. 142 While the existence of a national emergency is
the key that unlocks these powers, the National Emergencies
Act does not define what constitutes an emergency. Instead,
the National Emergencies Act reflects a broad delegation of
authority from Congress to the President, providing only
that “[w]ith respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the
exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any
special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized
to declare such national emergency.” 143 By failing to define
or provide articulable standards for what constitutes a
national emergency, Congress makes the President the sole
fact finder in determining whether there is a national
emergency. 144 When the President exercises this delegated
authority, 136 statutory powers become available to him. 145
These statutory powers are extensive, touching not only on
matters of military personnel, but also on transportation,
public health and safety, and spending authority. 146

141. See Patrick A. Thronson, Note, Toward Comprehensive Reform of
America’s Emergency Law Regime, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 753–54 (2013);
see also Samuel Weitzman, Note, Back to Good: Restoring the National
Emergencies Act, 54 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 370–71 (2021).
142. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651.
143. 50 U.S.C. § 1621.
144. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a).
145. A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 217 (The President can make commissioned members of the
public health service military officers.); 10 U.S.C. § 12302(a) (The President can
order ready reserve military members to active duty for up to 24 months); 31
U.S.C. § 3727(d) (The Department of Energy can contract without oversight.); 46
U.S.C. § 56309 (The Secretary of Transportation can take title of any merchant
vessel lying idle in U.S. waters.); see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note
145.
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Congress attempted to limit the extent of its delegation
of authority to the President by imposing a one year
expiration on the declaration. 147 It also requires the
President to specify the statutory powers he intends to
utilize, issue public notices if he intends to invoke additional
powers, make reports to Congress every six months, and
meet with Congress every six months to consider a vote on
termination. 148 Despite these measures, the National
Emergencies Act has “failed” to check presidential authority.
Of the fifty-eight emergencies declared since the act’s
passing, thirty-one remain in effect as of 2021. 149 These
presidentially declared emergencies include matters wellconnected to national security, including the “war in Syria
(since 2004); instability in Iraq (since 2003); Russian election
meddling, cyberattacks, and aggression against Ukraine;
charcoal exports from Somalia; and the use of child soldiers
in the Central African Republic.” 150 And these declared
emergencies tend to stretch much longer than the one year
expiration date, with the average “emergency” lasting nearly
ten years. 151 Thus, not only has Congress delegated its
national emergency power to the President, but it also
elected to not utilize the authority it retained for itself. The
sheer volume of “emergencies” that exist and their duration
indicate Congress is doing little to curtail executive branch
use (or abuse) of this statutory scheme.
When the President elects to invoke his authority under
the National Emergencies Act, he unlocks congressional
authority to take a number of actions that could be used to
authorize a presidential coup. For example, under 50 U.S.C.
§ 4533(a)(1), the President is authorized to “maintain,
147. 50 U.S.C. § 1601.
148. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1622; see also Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope
of the President’s Emergency Powers, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/.
149. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 145.
150. Murphy, supra note 16.
151. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 145.
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protect, and restore domestic industrial base capabilities
essential for national defense.” 152 Arguably, such language
authorizes him to use the federal military to provide such
defense. Further, the Act has been invoked to declare that
emergencies require “use of the Armed Forces.” 153 And
beyond the use of the armed forces, the Act gives the
President authority to seize property 154 and to levy economic
sanctions. 155
Generally, these congressional authorizations under the
National Emergencies Act establish at a minimum implicit—
and arguably explicit—authorization for the President to
assert broad and encompassing authority to respond to what
he perceives to be a national emergency. Significantly, the
Court has previously recognized where multiple statutes
create an inference that Congress intended to authorize
presidential power in matters of national security, the Court
will uphold that conduct. 156 Therefore, a malevolent
President may rely on congressional authorization per the
National Emergencies Act—buttressed by judicial deference
under Youngstown—to justify the use of the military in
domestic matters to effectuate a coup. 157
152. 50 U.S.C. § 4533(a)(1).
153. Proclamation No. 9,844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,949, 4,949 (Feb. 20, 2019) (relying
upon 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651); see also Jacqueline Lewis, The Executive’s Power
of the Purse in National Emergency: The President’s Plan to Poach Defense Funds
to Build the Wall, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 825, 826–28 (2020); Scott R. Anderson &
Margaret Taylor, What Authorities Is President Trump Using to Build a Border
Wall?, LAWFARE (Feb. 15, 2019, 2:39 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whatauthorities-president-trump-using-build-border-wall.
154. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 4208 (Provisions intended to protect farmland do not
apply to acquisition of farmland for national defense purposes.); 46 U.S.C.
§ 56309 (Secretary of Transportation can take title of any merchant vessel lying
idle in U.S. waters.).
155. Murphy, supra note 16.
156. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–79 (1981).
157. See generally Elizabeth Goitein, Trump Showed How Easily Presidents
Can Abuse Emergency Powers. Here’s How Congress Can Rein Them In.,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2021, 11:15 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine
/2021/01/22/trump-presidents-abuse-emergency-powers-congress-rein-in-
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3. The Insurrection Act and the National Emergencies
Act as Congressional Authorization of the Presidential
Coup
Taken together, the Insurrection Act and the National
Emergencies Act provide congressional authorization for the
President to “manufacture emergencies.” 158 Congress has
delegated to the President the fact-finding responsibility to
declare either an insurrection or a national emergency. And
this fact-finding determination is in turn unreviewable by
the judiciary. Once the President makes this fact-finding
determination, he is then vested with extensive powers,
which include utilizing the federal military to respond to the
perceived threats. Because the President is then acting with
congressional authorization under these statutes, he is at the
zenith of his power under Youngstown, and the judiciary will
provide minimal scrutiny of the actions he takes under this
authority.
What then prevents the President from manufacturing
these emergencies? Can he manufacture an emergency that
enables him to invoke the Insurrection Act and National
Emergencies Act? And can he do so to suppress his political
opposition or refuse to leave office? This Section has
answered all those questions in the affirmative. Not only
may the President make the plenary claims to such
authority, but he can claim congressional authorization
through the congressional acquiescence evidenced in the
Insurrection Act and National Emergencies Act.
D. The Third Breakdown of the Separation of Powers:
Judicial Abdication of Review
But what about the judiciary? While the judicial branch
may be the weakest, especially in terms of national security
or national threats, the courts retain the responsibility to

461293.
158. Tsai, supra note 16, at 594.
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“say what the law is.” 159 Should the President assert plenary
powers in identifying and responding to a national threat, or
should Congress delegate broad authority to the President,
the judiciary should have the authority to scrutinize such
actions and declare them unconstitutional if warranted. But
while courts have sometimes utilized this power, they have
largely abdicated it. 160
The Youngstown framework itself reflects this
abdication. If the President and Congress are acting
together, courts will give broad deference to the presidential
action. 161 And while courts will decide questions of which
branch has the constitutional authority to act, they will not
delve into matters of policy. 162 But courts are eager to label
matters of national security as policy questions, leaving
examination of presidential action to the news cycle—not the

159. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–9
(1983).
160. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) (holding that
Congress did not give the President authority to subject civilians to military
commissions); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
588–89 (1952) (holding the President did not have the authority to seize U.S. steel
mills under national security concerns); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 651
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting President Bush’s claims of plenary
authority to dictate military commission procedures because they did not comply
with an Act of Congress).
161. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who
might attack it.”).
162. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial
intervention.”); see also Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 552 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“This is a case in which the political branches, exercising powers explicitly
assigned them by our Constitution, formulated policies with profound
implications for national security. One may agree or not agree with those policies.
One may debate whether they were or were not the most effective
counterterrorism strategy. But the forum for such debates is not the civil cause
of action pressed in the case at bar.”)
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courts. 163 Under this construct, should the president utilize
congressional authorization such as the Insurrection Act to
manufacture a crisis and utilize military power to effectuate
a coup, the judiciary is likely to stop its review after
determining whether Congress properly delegated such
authority to the President under the Youngstown
framework. 164
Even if courts were to review the President’s response,
they are unlikely to declare his conduct unconstitutional.
First, wide latitude and deference is given to the Executive
when a finding of fact must be made to unlock statutory
authorization to use military force. Second, because the
President is the commander in chief of the military, wide
latitude and deference is given to him on how to employ
military force.
Because the Supreme Court has affirmed Congress can
grant broad authority to the Executive, it has also recognized
that its role in reviewing the exercise of that authority is
limited. 165 Statutes confer authority upon the President in
many ways, but generally the President is required to make
a finding of fact to act under the statute’s provision, as
evidenced by the Insurrection Act and National Emergencies
Act. 166 These findings of fact, in matters of national security,
tend to be written in broad language as Congress cannot
anticipate every national security issue the President might

163. See Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation,
Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 881–
83 (2013).
164. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV.
1361, 1362 (2009).
165. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REV. 649, 675 (2007); see also Deborah N. Pearlstein, A Measure of Deference:
Justice Stevens from Chevron to Hamdan, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1063, 1065
(2010).
166. 10 U.S.C. § 252 (“Whenever the President considers . . . .”); id. (“[T]he
President . . . [shall take measures] he considers necessary . . . .”); 50 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (“[T]he President is authorized to declare such national emergency.”).
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be faced with. 167 Once the finding of fact is made, however,
courts rarely review the merits of the finding. 168
The Supreme Court provided a clear and unequivocal
answer to this question in 1827. In the case of Martin v. Mott,
the Court considered a 1795 statute whereby Congress
authorized the President to respond to national security
concerns. 169 The statute provided:
[W]henever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent
danger of invasion . . . it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States to call forth such number of the militia of the State
or States . . . as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and
to issue his order for that purpose . . . as he shall think proper. 170

In taking up the issue of whether the President’s
determinations are reviewable, the Court answered
unequivocally: no. “We are all of opinion, that the authority
167. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
168. See Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 86465 (2019) (arguing that the Take Care Clause requires, at a minimum, the
President act faithfully in his fact-finding inquiry; this in turn requires some level
of honesty in the fact finding as a check on broad grants of authority to the
President); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 28 (2008)
(The Court might have been able to reverse the lower court’s injunction against
the Navy by reviewing the various statutory schemes granting broad regulatory
power over environmental issues to Executive branch officials; but even in
reviewing the merits of the preliminary injunction, the Court ruled in favor of the
Navy, noting that “[t]he lower courts did not give sufficient weight to the views
of several top Navy officers . . . .” In short, even when the Court reviews the
merits of the military’s claims, it will accord extreme deference to them.); Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1973) (Although the case questioned state officials’
use of the National Guard to respond to protests at Kent State, the Court’s
language is unequivocal: “Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of
governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex,
subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and
control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject
always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. . . . It is this
power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and
officials which underlies our entire constitutional system; the majority opinion of
the Court of Appeals failed to give appropriate weight to this separation of
powers.”).
169. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28–29 (1827).
170. Id. at 29.
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to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs
exclusively to the President, and that his decision is
conclusive upon all other persons.” 171 The Court determined
by the language of the statute and the evinced congressional
intent that the President alone would be the finder of fact
and the branch of government responsible for responding to
the threat. 172 This early interpretation of congressional
authorizations fortifies the President’s fact-finding power,
especially in matters of national security. 173
More to the point, the Court addressed presidential factfinding power in relation to insurrection in Hamilton v.
Dillin. 174 Although a challenge to presidential power to
regulate commerce, the Court also addressed presidential
power to determine whether a state was participating in the
insurrection against the Union. 175 The Court noted that
under congressional authorization the President “clearly had
authority” to determine whether an entire state, or just one
district of it, was in a state of insurrection. 176 Dillin therefore
established, in particular, the President has the authority to
determine whether and to what extent an insurrection exists
within a given state. 177 This is especially true in light of how
little the language of the Insurrection Act has changed over
time. 178
The Court addressed presidential fact finding more
recently in Trump v. Hawaii. 179 There, plaintiffs challenged
171. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
172. See id. at 31.
173. The Court did not shy away from the potential for abuse of this type of
fact-finding power, but in doing so acknowledged that there is a check on such a
broad power: elections. See id. at 32.
174. See generally 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73 (1874).
175. Id. at 95.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Compare H.R. 1037, 25th Cong. (1839), with 10 U.S.C. §§ 252–253.
179. See 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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the President’s executive orders denying entry to immigrants
from majority-Muslim countries. 180 The President acted
under congressional authorization to “restrict the entry of
aliens whenever he finds that their entry ‘would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States.’” 181
President Trump justified the initial ban as a matter of
national security. 182 But after challenges to the first round of
executive orders, he directed agencies, such as the
Department of Homeland Security, to conduct fact-finding
inquiries on these issues. 183 Questions of a country’s
willingness to report criminal and terrorist activity were a
specific part of the fact-finding review. 184 After discussing
the various fact-finding efforts on the part of executive
agencies like the Department of Homeland Security, the
Court noted that the President’s justification for restricting
travel from these particular countries related to issues of
national security. 185
The Court determined that Congress’ grant of authority
to the President was not just broad, 186 but also contained no
requirement that the President justify his findings “with
sufficient detail to enable judicial review.” 187 Trump v.
Hawaii therefore confirms that where Congress grants the
President broad authority and includes no standard of
review, presidential fact finding is conclusive—especially in
180. Id. at 2403.
181. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)).
182. See id. at 2403–04.
183. Id. at 2403–06.
184. Id. at 2404.
185. Id. at 2405.
186. Id. at 2408 (“By its terms, § 1182(f) exudes deference to the President in
every clause. It entrusts to the President the decisions whether and when to
suspend entry . . . ; whose entry to suspend . . . ; for how long . . . ; and on what
conditions. It is therefore unsurprising that we have previously observed that
§ 1182(f) vests the President with ‘ample power’ to impose entry restrictions . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
187. Id. at 2409; see also generally Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
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the context of national security. 188
the
courts
have
abdicated
their
Similarly,
responsibilities by consistently finding that once the
President has the authority to act and makes the appropriate
findings of fact, he alone has the power to decide how to use
the force. Specifically, how the President chooses to use the
military in light of congressional authorization or as an
incident of his plenary power is a political question
unreviewable by the courts. In DaCosta v. Laird, the Second
Circuit considered a challenge to the constitutionality of
President Nixon’s “unilateral” orders to begin mining North
Vietnamese harbors after Congress passed the Mansfield
Amendment. 189 This amendment expressly provided that it
was the United States’ policy “to terminate at the earliest
practicable date all military operations of the United States
in Indochina” to include the withdrawal of all American
forces. 190 However, in response to North Vietnamese military
conduct after Congress passed the Mansfield Amendment,
President Nixon escalated American military operations in
the area. 191
The Second Circuit refused to consider whether this
strategic decision was unconstitutional, although it was not
authorized by Congress. The appellant argued that by
passing the Mansfield Amendment, Congress only
authorized the President to use military force to de-escalate,
and ultimately end, the war in Vietnam. 192 The court posited
that whether President Nixon’s orders amounted to an

188. See also Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding
that President Obama’s finding of fact that ISIL fell within the 2001 and 2002
AUMF to be “precisely the type of discretionary military determination that is
committed to the political branches and which the Court has no judicially
manageable standards to adjudicate”).
189. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147, 1154 (2d Cir. 1973).
190. Id. at 1156.
191. Or, at a minimum, launched new military initiatives. See id. at 1148–50.
192. Id. at 1154.
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unauthorized “escalation” 193 of the war was a question with
no justiciable standard of review. 194 Therefore, it held the
matter a political question. 195
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his capacity as Circuit
Justice, addressed presidential power to make military
decisions once Congress authorizes the use of military force
in Holtzman v. Schlesinger. 196 In reviewing whether
President Nixon’s continued bombing of Cambodia was
constitutional in light of Congress’ passing of the Fulbright
Proviso—which prohibited the use of military funding to
“directly or indirectly” support military operations there—he
refused to vacate the Second Circuit’s determination that
such a question was a political question. 197 When initially
considering this question, the Second Circuit noted that “if
we were incompetent to judge the significance of the mining
and bombing of North Vietnam’s harbors and territories, we
fail to see our competence to determine that the bombing of
Cambodia is a ‘basic change’ in the situation and that it is
not a ‘tactical decision’ within the competence of the
President.” 198 By accepting the Second Circuit’s rationale
that a President’s decision as to how to use military power
was a political question, Justice Marshall strongly suggests
that how the President elects to use military force—here the
bombing of Cambodia—is outside of judicial review. 199 These
holdings in effect, meant the President had the power to
make tactical decisions on who to bomb, where to bomb them,

193. Id. at 1155.
194. Id.
195. Importantly, the court again noted congressional funding of the Vietnam
military operations, and it also noted that there was no language in the Mansfield
Amendment “prohibit[ing]” the President’s conduct. See id. at 1157.
196. 414 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1973).
197. Id. at 1307–15.
198. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973).
199. See Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1314–15.
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and when. 200
In sum, the judiciary has severely limited its role in
reviewing foreign affairs and national security matters.
When determining which branch has the authority to act,
courts will utilize the Youngstown framework to give broad
deference to the Executive, especially when Congress has
authorized such action. And then once action is taken, courts
will give broad deference to any finding of fact made by the
President or to any military action taken by the President in
response. As such, should the President declare an
insurrection or national emergency under congressional
authorization, he is likely acting at the zenith of his power,
without any judicial review of his finding that such a state
exists or of his utilization of the military to quell the
emergency.
E. The Separation of Powers in a State of Dysfunction
The constitutional separation of powers is in a state of
dysfunction. Presidents have been allowed to assert
sweeping plenary powers in declaring and responding to
national emergencies and threats. In turn, Congress has
delegated much of its authority over these matters to the
presidency. Meanwhile, the judiciary has created a
framework that gives broad deference to the President when
acting under congressional authorization in making findings
of fact and electing to utilize military power in response. And
as such, the environment is ripe for a presidential coup. A
President looking to use military power to suppress his
political opponents or to remain in office only needs to
declare an insurrection or national emergency and then
unlock broad authority to utilize military power to achieve
his coup. The President may then not only claim the
authority to do so but may also assert that he is acting within
his legal authority to use the military power at his disposal
200. See id.; see also Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 76, 77 (D.D.C.
2014).

420

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

to effectuate a coup.
II. THE INFORMAL CHECKS:
MORAL AND POLITICAL CHECKS
Much as the Framers feared executive power and
domination from their experiences as colonists, the Supreme
Court writing in the wake of World War II shared similar
concerns. 201 The experiences of Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union were prevalent in the minds of the Court, leading the
Court to reimagine “constitutional doctrine in ways designed
to prevent a totalitarian regime, communist or otherwise,
from arising in the United States.” 202 This reimagining was
especially noticeable in checking the authority of the
President.
In Youngstown, while striking down President Truman’s
seizure of the steel mills, several Justices alluded to the rise
of totalitarianism throughout the world. 203 For instance,
Justice Frankfurter alluded to the “experience through
which the world has passed in our own day has made vivid”
the threats posed by an unchecked Executive. 204 Similarly,
Justice Jackson posited that “if we seek instruction . . . from
the executive powers in those governments we disparagingly
describe as totalitarian,” that such lesson would be to not

201. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943)
(“Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought
essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by
evil men . . . down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The
Framers of the Constitution knew human nature as well as we do. They too had
lived in dangerous days; they too knew the suffocating influence of orthodoxy and
standardized thought. . . . They chose liberty. That should be our choice today
. . . .”).
202. Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in
Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1996).
203. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (Jackson,
J., concurring) (1952); see also Primus, supra note 202, at 443.
204. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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leave the Executive unchecked. 205 Justice Douglas added,
“[T]he emergency did not create power; it merely marked an
occasion when power should be exercised. . . . All executive
power—from the reign of ancient kings to the rule of modern
dictators—has the outward appearance of efficiency.” 206
However, with the fall of Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union, the fears of totalitarianism faded. 207 And so too did
the Court’s willingness to check executive authority. 208 As
discussed in the prior part, Congress and the judiciary have
taken a more deferential and respectful posture towards the
presidency. The efficiency of investing large amounts of
authority in the executive branch has come to outweigh the
fear that the President will utilize this authority to conduct
a presidential coup. 209 Implicit in much of Congress’
acquiescence to presidential authority—and in the
judiciary’s abdication of its reviewing authority—is that the
President does not have to be feared.
But why? Why do Congress and the judiciary accept that
the President can be given large swaths of power without
fearing a presidential coup? And why does the President not
abuse this trust and power that has been placed in him? This
Part argues that with the fall and decline of the formal check
of separation of powers came the rise of informal checks
protecting against a presidential coup. Specifically, this Part
argues that two categories of informal checks emerged that
not only protected against a presidential coup, but also
justified Congress’ and the judiciary’s faith in legitimatizing
presidential authority: (1) the moral check, and (2) the
205. Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
207. See Carl Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and
Postwar Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 209–10 (2000).
208. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power,
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1112–13
(2013).
209. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 32–33 (1995).
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political check. After establishing these checks, this Part
argues that both of these categories are also in a state of
dysfunction, leaving little protection against a presidential
coup.
A. The Moral Check: The Benevolent President and the
Constitutionally Faithful Military
The first category of informal checks is the moral check.
For the President to engage in a presidential coup, he will
need to make the choice to violate democratic norms that
permeate American political culture. And from there, to
execute the coup, the military must elect to follow his orders.
The moral check is the belief that neither the President nor
the military would make these choices, namely that the
President will be benevolent with the power entrusted to
him, and that the military will not follow the orders of
malevolent President. But the Trump presidency and its
aftermath have called into question this moral check,
especially the faith in the benevolent President. When
coupled with a military that has been trained in what it
perceives to be constitutional obedience to the President, the
moral check exists in a state of dysfunction.
1. The Benevolent President
When the Supreme Court allowed President Roosevelt
and the military to intern Japanese citizens during World
War II, Justice Jackson warned that “once a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, . . . [t]he
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.” 210 While each President following
President Roosevelt held this “loaded weapon” and wielded
210. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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the power entrusted to them, they all drew a line when it
came to staging a presidential coup. 211
In many ways, the refusal of modern Presidents to “cross
the Rubicon” 212 and use the military power at their disposal
to suppress their political opponents or to remain in office
reflects a consistent presidential commitment to what Aziz
Huq and Tom Ginsburg identify as the three institutional
prerequisites for democracy: “(1) a democratic electoral
system, most importantly periodic-and-fair elections in
which a losing side cedes power; (2) the liberal rights to
speech and association that are closely linked to democracy
in practice; and (3) the stability, predictability, and integrity
of law and legal institutions—the rule of law.” 213 A
commitment to these prerequisites forecloses the President
from using the military to effectuate a presidential coup. For
the American public, they can place their trust in a
benevolent President who will not abuse the power at his
disposal because of the assumption that American
Presidents will also abide by these democratic values and
commitments.
The limited use and way the Insurrection Act has been
invoked speaks to the presidential commitment to
democratic values. 214 Following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education 215—and the refusal
211. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 129–34
(2018).
212. See 2 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 199–244
(Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Drydon trans., Random House Publ’g Grp. 2001).
213. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65
UCLA L. REV. 78, 87 (2018).
214. See, e.g., Isaac Tekie, Note, Bringing the Troops Home to a Disaster: Law,
Order, and Humanitarian Relief, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1227, 1258 (2006); Michael
Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent
the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastrophe, 26
MISS. C. L. REV. 107, 107–14 (2007); see also Thaddeus Hoffmeister, An
Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century, 39 STETSON L. REV. 861, 884–90
(2010).
215. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of several southern states to desegregate their schools—both
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy invoked the
Insurrection Act to deploy federal military forces to enforce
federal law. 216 President Eisenhower’s declaration
authorized the Secretary of Defense to deploy forces,
specifically stating the military was required to remove “the
obstruction of justice with respect to enrollment at Little
Rock school district.” 217 President Kennedy’s invocation to
support integration of state universities in Mississippi and
Alabama read much the same, authorizing military
commanders to “remove all obstructions of justice”
preventing integration. 218 Of note, each of these invocations
authorized the Department of Defense to activate the
National Guard to enforce these orders for an “indefinite
period.” 219
But despite the broad grants of authority in these
invocations of the Insurrection Act, they were predicated
upon the enforcement of federal law, a unanimous Supreme
Court decision, and the protection of civil liberties for African
Americans in the South. 220 Further, the military refrained
from utilizing lethal force, the elected governors remained in
power—free to voice dissent and opposition to desegregation,
216. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Domestic Constitutional Violence, 41 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 211, 213, 229–30 (2019); see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias,
Trump’s Insurrection: Pandemic Violence, Presidential Incitement and the
Republican Guarantee, 11 U. MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV., no. 2, Spring 2021,
at 7, 29–30.
217. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7,628 (Sept. 25, 1957).
218. Exec. Order No. 11,053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9,693 (Oct. 2, 1962); Exec. Order No.
11,111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5,709 (June 12, 1963); Exec. Order No. 11,118, 28 Fed. Reg.
9,863 (Sept. 11, 1963).
219. Exec. Order No. 11,053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9,693 (Oct. 2, 1962); Exec. Order No.
11,111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5,709 (June 12, 1963); Exec. Order No. 11,118, 28 Fed. Reg.
9,863 (Sept. 11, 1963).
220. See Mark Stern, Eisenhower and Kennedy: A Comparison of
Confrontations at Little Rock and Ole Miss, 21 POL’Y STUD. J. 575, 576-78 (1993);
see also Kasey S. Pipes, Eisenhower Was Key Desegregation Figure, POLITICO
(Sept. 18, 2007, 7:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2007/09/eisenhowerwas-key-desegregation-figure-005885.
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and the military shortly exited upon achieving its limited
purpose of enforcing federal law. 221 Perhaps most telling,
President Eisenhower invoked the Insurrection Act to
enforce Brown, which he generally did not support. 222
A commitment to democratic values is also present when
a President elects to not invoke the Insurrection Act. When
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005,
President George W. Bush considered invoking the
Insurrection Act to provide both services and law and order
capabilities through the military to New Orleans. 223 He first
encouraged Louisiana’s governor to request such assistance,
but when she refused to do so, he still refused to invoke the
act. 224 To President Bush, by unilaterally declaring an
insurrection and then deploying the federal military to New
Orleans, “the world would see a male Republican president
usurping the authority of a female governor by declaring an
insurrection in a largely African-American city.” 225 Believing
that invoking the Insurrection Act “could unleash holy
hell,” 226 President Bush recognized the limitations of the
authority given to him, considering that his wielding of such
authority could be seen as an attack against democratic
values.

221. See Michael S. Mayer, With Much Deliberation and Some Speed:
Eisenhower and the Brown Decision, 52 J.S. HIST. 43, 50 (1986); see also Sheldon
M. Stern, John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Race and Civil Rights, 35 REVS.
AM. HIST. 118, 120 (2007) (reviewing NICK BRYANT, THE BYSTANDERS: JOHN F.
KENNEDY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2006)).
222. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 211, at 130.
223. See Joshua M. Samek, Note, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
A Case for Repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act or a Case for Learning the Law?, 61
U. MIA. L. REV. 441, 460–65 (2007); see generally Sean McGrane, Note, Katrina,
Federalism, and Military Law Enforcement: A New Exception to the Posse
Comitatus Act, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1322–23 (2010).
224. See Bruce Alpert, Bush Recalls Katrina Aftermath in ‘Decision Points’
Memoir, NOLA (Nov. 9, 2010, 6:10 AM), https://www.nola.com/news/politics
/article_e011f389-6125-57d3-b16c-b5977453c25d.html.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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Even outside of the contours of the Insurrection Act,
Presidents throughout the “imperial presidency” timeframe
have pulled back in their assertions of authority. 227
President Roosevelt halted his plan to pack the Supreme
Court; 228 President Truman complied with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Youngstown; 229 President Nixon conceded
to President Kennedy in 1960 despite potential election
irregularities and then, after pushing the limits of his
authority during the Watergate scandal, provided his Oval
Office recordings to Congress and eventually resigned from
office; 230 Presidents Reagan and Clinton tolerated special
prosecutors; 231 Vice President Gore respected the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore and conceded to President
Bush; 232 and the majority of Presidents have enforced laws
that they personally did not support. 233 Underlying these
presidential actions or inactions is a choice to be made by the
President. Each President had to decide whether to cross the
proverbial Rubicon with the power entrusted to him. And as
they made their decisions, they were driven in part by their
commitment to the democratic prerequisites.
Although President Trump may not have staged a coup,

227. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 211, at 129–34. See generally ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
228. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 211, at 132–33.
229. Id. at 130.
230. See id. at 130, 141–43; see also Hal Brands, Burying Theodore White:
Recent Accounts of the 1960 Presidential Election, 40 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 364,
364–67 (2010) (book review).
231. See Ron Elving, Potent But Unpredictable: How Special Counsels Have
Posed a Special Threat, NPR (Mar. 21, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/03/21/699982049/potent-but-unpredictable-how-special-counsels-haveposed-a-special-threat. See generally BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS
AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE (1999).
232. See 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Andrew Rice, The 2000 Election Never
Ended, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/11/bushv-gore-and-the-2000-election-never-ended.html.
233. See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2187, 2200–03 (2018).
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he and his administration perhaps approached the Rubicon
more closely than any prior President. 234 President Trump
not only disregarded several presidential norms and political
conventions, but he also appeared to have little concern or
adherence to the democratic values or prerequisites required
to sustain the moral check entrusting the President not to
abuse the power at his disposal. While much has been
written regarding the breakdown of norms during the Trump
presidency, the breakdown is especially problematic in
discussing the prerequisites for democracy. 235
First, although President Trump did leave office at the
end of his term, his presidency was marked by an apparent
disregard for the democratic electoral system. Prior to the
November 2020 election, he made several comments
suggesting that he would not leave office and that any
election would likely be wrought with fraud. Consider the
following comments, all made between July and September
2020: “Well, we’re going to have to see what happens. . . . And
the ballots are a disaster”; “[T]his scam the Democrats are
pulling—it’s a scam—this scam will be before the United
States Supreme Court”; “[T]he Democrats are trying to rig
this election”; “We are going to win four more years. And then
after that, we’ll go for another four years”; and finally when
asked whether he would accept the election results, he
234. See Jamie Gangel et al., ‘They’re Not Going to F**king Succeed’: Top
Generals Feared Trump Would Attempt a Coup After Election, According to New
Book, CNN (July 14, 2021, 9:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/14/politics
/donald-trump-election-coup-new-book-excerpt/index.html; see also Quint
Forgey, Trump Denies Coup Attempt in Latest Attack on Milley, POLITICO (July
15, 2021, 12:48 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/15/trump-denycoup-mark-milley-499763 (“[I]f I was going to do a coup, one of the last people I
would want to do it with is General Mark Milley.”).
235. See generally Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions,
and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177 (2018); David Orentlicher, Political
Dysfunction and the Election of Donald Trump: Problems of the U.S.
Constitution’s Presidency, 50 IND. L. REV. 246 (2016); Josh Chafetz & David E.
Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA. L. REV. 1430 (2018);
Ben Gittleson, How Trump Obliterated Norms and Changed the Presidency, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2021, 2:29 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-legacyobliterated-norms-chipped-institutions-end/story?id=75275806.

428

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

responded, “No. I have to see . . . . I’m not going to just say
‘yes.’” 236
President Trump continued to question the credibility of
the election after it appeared Vice President Biden won. 237
Between November 2020 and January 2021, President
Trump and his supporters filed over sixty lawsuits alleging
election fraud. 238 Beyond lawsuits, he immediately claimed
victory and continued to assert these claims through
Perhaps
most
President
Biden’s
inauguration. 239
dramatically, he encouraged large-scale protests at the U.S.
Capitol in support of his claims of electoral victory and voting
fraud. 240 And when these protests became increasingly
violent, resulting in an insurrection at the Capitol, President
Trump appeared to remain supportive and delayed any sort
236. Kevin Liptak, A List of the Times Trump Has Said He Won’t Accept the
Election Results or Leave Office if He Loses, CNN (Sept. 24, 2020, 9:59 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/24/politics/trump-election-warnings-leaving-office
/index.html; see also Molly Jong-Fast, What Happens if Trump Actually Refuses
to Accept Election Results? VOGUE (Oct. 2020), https://www.vogue.com/article
/what-if-donald-trump-refuses-to-accept-the-2020-election-results.
237. See Andrew Higgins, Trump’s Post-Election Tactics Put Him in Unsavory
Company, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11
/world/europe/trump-autocrats-dictators.html (quoting Serhii Plohky, who
claimed “Trump’s behavior is without precedent among leaders in Western
democracies”).
238. William Cummings et al., By the Numbers: President Donald Trump’s
Failed Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumpsfailed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/.
239. See Kevin Liptak, Trump Seeks to Delegitimize Vote Even as His
Campaign Says Math Will Turn His Way, CNN (Nov. 4, 2020, 8:47 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/04/politics/trump-election-results/index.html; see
also Brian Naylor, Trump Won’t Attend Inauguration; Congress Pushes Ahead
With Capitol Ceremony, NPR (Jan. 8, 2021, 2:10 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/biden-transition-updates/2021/01/08/954865776/trump-wont-attendinauguration-congress-pushes-ahead-with-capitol-ceremony.
240. See Rebecca Ballhaus et al., Trump and His Allies Set the Stage for Riot
Well Before January 6, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2021, 8:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/trump-and-his-allies-set-the-stage-for-riot-well-before-january-611610156283; see also Dan Barry & Sheera Frenkel, ‘Be There. Will be Wild!’:
Trump All but Circled the Date, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www
.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/capitol-mob-trump-supporters.html.
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of official government response. 241 His rhetoric, actions, and
support for the Capitol insurrection were alarming enough
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark
Milley, feared that the President would take some military
action—including deploying the military domestically—to
dispute the election. 242
Second, President Trump displayed an aversion to the
liberal rights to speech and association that are closely
linked to democracy in practice. This aversion was especially
apparent in President Trump’s response to the Black Lives
Matter protests that arose in the summer of 2020 after a
white police officer shot and killed George Floyd, an African
American man. 243 President Trump frequently referred to
these protestors as “thugs” or violent, when in fact the
majority of protests were peaceful in nature. 244 Further,
President Trump encouraged governors to “dominate”
protestors and then contemplated invoking the Insurrection
241. See Chris Cillizza, The Devastating Silence of the Trump Administration
on the Capitol Riot, CNN (Jan. 12, 2021, 11:42 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01
/12/politics/federal-government-silent-attacks-riot/index.html; see also Brakkton
Booker, House Democrats Use Trump’s Own Words to Argue He Showed No
Remorse After Attack, NPR (Feb. 11, 2021, 4:19 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/trump-impeachment-trial-live-updates/2021/02/11/967034292/housedemocrats-use-trumps-own-words-to-argue-he-showed-no-remorse-after-attack.
242. CAROL LEONNIG & PHILIP RUCKER, I ALONE CAN FIX IT: DONALD J. TRUMP’S
CATASTROPHIC FINAL YEAR 363–66 (2021).
243. See generally Jason Silverstein, The Global Impact of George Floyd: How
Black Lives Matter Protests Shaped Movements Around the World, CBS NEWS,
(June 4, 2021, 7:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-floyd-black-livesmatter-impact/.
244. See Philip Bump, Over and Over, Trump Has Focused on Black Lives
Matters as a Target of Derision or Violence, WASH. POST (Sept 1, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/01/over-over-trump-hasfocused-black-lives-matter-target-derision-or-violence/; see also Christina Wilkie,
Trump Cranks Up Attacks on the Black Lives Matter Movement for Racial Justice,
CNBC (June 26, 2020, 7:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/25/trumpattacks-black-lives-matter-racial-justice-movement.html; Tommy Beer, Trump
Called BLM Protestors ‘Thugs’ But Capitol-Storming Supports ‘Very Special,’
FORBES (Jan. 6, 2021, 6:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2021/01
/06/trump-called-blm-protesters-thugs-but-capitol-storming-supporters-veryspecial/.
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Act to quell the protests when they reached in Washington,
D.C. 245 Although he declined to invoke the Insurrection Act,
President Trump did ready the federal military to potentially
quell the protests and then used military resources as a
“show of force” against the protestors. 246
Third, President Trump largely disregarded the
stability, predictability, and integrity of law and legal
institutions—the rule of law. As noted by Neil Siegel,
President Trump consistently “undermine[d] public
confidence in the federal judiciary by disparaging the federal
courts and particular federal judges in ways that are
unprecedented in modern times.” 247 He displayed extra
disdain to the Supreme Court following his election loss,
claiming “[t]he Supreme Court had ZERO interest in the
merits of the greatest voter fraud ever perpetrated on the
United States.” 248
In sum, President Trump’s rejection of the basic
prerequisites for democracy calls into question the
expectation of a benevolent President who will respect
democratic values and refuse to abuse the power at his
discretion. Instead of solidifying the moral check, the Trump
245. Matt Perez, Trump Tells Governors to ‘Dominate’ Protestors, ‘Put Them in
Jail for 10 Years,’ FORBES (June 1, 2020, 1:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/mattperez/2020/06/01/trump-tells-governors-to-dominate-protesters-put-themin-jail-for-10-years/; see also Richard Altieri & Margaret Taylor, How Presidents
Talk About Deploying the Military in the United States, LAWFARE (June 16, 2020,
8:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-presidents-talk-about-deployingmilitary-united-states.
246. Thomas Gibbons-Neff et al., Former Commanders Fault Trump’s Use of
Troops Against Protestors, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/06/02/us/politics/military-national-guard-trump-protests.html.
247. Siegel, supra note 235, at 193.
248. Jeff Mason, Trump Castigates Supreme Court, Barr as Election
Challenges Sputter, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2020, 1:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-election/trump-castigates-supreme-court-barr-as-electionchallenges-sputter-idUSKBN28M0T7; see also In His Own Words: The
President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/his-own-wordspresidents-attacks-courts (providing a thorough collection of President Trump’s
attacks against the judiciary).
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Administration placed it in a state of dysfunction, suggesting
the real possibility of a future malevolent President who will
push further than President Trump and abuse the power at
his disposal to stage a coup.
And while President Trump is no longer in office, the
dysfunction in this moral check remains. Consider the
aftermath of the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the U.S.
Capitol. Since the Capitol insurrection, Republican leaders
have largely diminished the events of that day, with some
even suggesting it was a “normal tourist visit.” 249 Similarly,
his disparagement of the electoral process remains in place,
with over fifty percent of Republicans believing the election
“was stolen” and that President Trump remains the true
President. 250 Therefore, the Trump Administration
continues to stand for a decay in the moral check that the
President can be trusted to abide by democratic values and
not use the military power at his disposal to effectuate a
coup.
2. The Constitutionally Faithful Military
What about the military? If a malevolent President
manufactures an insurrection and orders the military to
secure the instruments of national power to allow the
President to remain in office at the expiration of his term,
would the military follow those orders? The belief that the
military would refuse such an order serves as a secondary
moral check against a presidential coup. As the most trusted

249. See Grace Segers, “Normal Tourist Visit”: Some Republicans Downplay
January 6 Riot Amid Democratic Objections, CBS NEWS (May 13, 2021, 12:04
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/capitol-riot-january-6-hearing-lawmakersclash/; see also Colby Itkowitz, Republicans Case Jan. 6 Attack on Capitol by ProTrump Mob, WASH. POST (May 12, 2021, 5:51 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-riot-capitol-republicans/2021/05/12/dcc03342-b351-11eb
-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html.
250. Chris Kahn, 53% of Republicans View Trump as True U.S. President,
REUTERS (May 24, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/53republicans-view-trump-true-us-president-reutersipsos-2021-05-24/.
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institution in the United States, 251 there is a widespread and
common belief that the military’s loyalty belongs to the
Constitution and not the President as the commander in
chief. 252 Because of that constitutional faithfulness, the
assumption is that the military would refuse any orders from
the President which it perceives to be antithetical to the
Constitution and its values. 253 Thus, should the President
attempt to use the military to effectuate a coup, the military
would refuse to do so, and the President will lack the tools to
carry out his coup.
However, this Section challenges the assumption of a
constitutionally faithful military. While the military is far
from a monolithic entity, with myriad sub-cultures and subloyalties, there have been sufficient trends prevalent
throughout the military, especially at a senior military
officer level, which suggest this informal moral check is also

251. See Polina Beliakova, Erosion by Deference: Civilian Control and the
Military in Policymaking, 4 TEX. NAT’L SEC. REV., no. 3, Summer 2021, at 56, 58;
see also Rosa Brooks, Serving in the Military Doesn’t Make You Special, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-brooksmilitary-sacred-20160810-snap-story.html.
252. See, e.g., Tom Kolditz, Military’s Loyalty to the Constitution is Saving Our
Democracy from Trump Right Now, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Opinion-Military-s-loyalty-to-theConstitution-15717023.php; Jesse Hamilton, The Military’s Allegiance to the
Constitution Should Comfort Americans, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/2021/01/19/the-militarys-allegiance-to-theconstitution-should-comfort-americans-column/.
253. See generally Raphael S. Cohen, Looking Beyond the Generals in the
Room: The Real Cause of America’s Civil-Military Malaise, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(Mar.
29,
2018),
https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/looking-beyond-thegenerals-in-the-room-the-real-cause-of-americas-civil-military-malaise/
(“This
isolation has led to a romanticization of the military. . . . Americans paint the
military as a paragon of patriotism, selflessness, and efficiency . . . .”); Jim Golby
& Peter Feaver, The Military Would Put Down Michael Flynn’s Proposed
Insurrection, MIL. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2021), https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion
/commentary/2021/01/03/the-military-would-put-down-michael-flynns-proposedinsurrection/ (“The best outcome is for civilian officials, starting with President
Trump, to rule any use of the military to determine the outcome of the election
strictly out of bounds. But if there is any doubt, senior military leaders may be
forced to make clear that Flynn does not speak for them.”).
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in a state of dysfunction. 254 These trends are: (1) the
ambiguity in defining what constitutes a legal order; (2) an
acceptance of a commander in chief-centric view of civilian
control of the military; and (3) the rise of careerism and
extremism within the military.
First, the ambiguity in defining what constitutes a legal
order suggests dysfunction in the moral check offered by
military constitutional faithfulness. All military members
have a duty to obey lawful orders; the inverse is also true as
they have a legal duty and defense to disobey unlawful
orders. 255 But what constitutes a lawful or an unlawful order
is often unclear. 256 This ambiguity is especially concerning in
the realm of presidential orders. 257 When the President
orders military action, the constitutional nature of his action
is often contested and unclear. 258 Whether the presidential
order involves large scale deployments of military force or
limited deployments such as airstrikes, a good faith
argument is made that the President lacks constitutional

254. See Karen O. Dunivin, Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift?, MAXWELL
PAPERS, Feb. 1997, at i, 10 (1997); see also Paul D. Eaton, Antonio M. Taguba &
Steven M. Anderson, 3 Retired Generals: The Military Must Prepare Now for a
2024 Insurrection, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2021, 5:05 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/2021/12/17/eaton-taguba-anderson-generals-military/; Geoff
Colvin, Retired Brigadier General Says Trump Loyalists in Military Need Rooting
Out, FORTUNE (Jan. 8, 2021, 8:52 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/08
/trump-support-military-capitol-coup-attempt/.
255. See 10 U.S.C. § 892; see also Eugene R. Fidell, Wrestling with Legal and
Illegal Orders in the Military in the Months Ahead, JUST SEC. (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/72934/wrestling-with-legal-and-illegal-orders-inthe-military-in-the-months-ahead/.
256. See Shane Reeves & David Wallace, Can US Service Members Disobey an
Order to Waterboard a Terrorist?, LAWFARE (Apr. 6, 2016, 9:56 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-us-service-members-disobey-order-waterboard
-terrorist; see also James E. Baker, Good Governance Paper No. 21: Obedience to
Orders, Lawful Orders, and the Military’s Constitutional Compact, JUST SEC.
(Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73221/good-governance-paper-no-21obedience-to-orders-lawful-orders-and-the-militarys-constitutional-compact/.
257. See Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The Conflict of Conscience and
Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 83–93 (2018).
258. Id. at 84.
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authority when acting absent a declaration of war. 259 But the
lawfulness of these military actions often is rendered moot
by the President either establishing the legality of these
actions himself via an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum
or by courts refusing to address the constitutionality of the
President’s use of military force. 260
A similar conundrum arises when it comes to following
the President’s orders to effectuate a military coup. As
discussed in the previous Part, a President’s use of the
military to enforce a coup may be legally justified. A
President can use his plenary authority along with
congressional authorization through the Insurrection Act or
the National Emergencies Act to legally justify his order. His
Office of Legal Counsel can then draft an opinion supporting

259. See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 36–39 (1991); see
also David A. Simon, Ending Perpetual War? Constitutional War Termination
Powers and the Conflict Against Al Qaeda, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 754–60 (2014);
Brian Finucane & Stephen Pomper, War Powers Guard Rails Can Keep the U.S.
From Sliding into a New Middle East War, JUST SEC. (July 2, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/77304/war-powers-guard-rails-can-help-the-u-sfrom-sliding-into-a-new-middle-east-war/ (discussing the constitutionality of
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria absent congressional authorization); Stephen
Pomper, The Soleimani Strike and the Case for War Powers Reform, JUST SEC.
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69124/the-soleimani-strike-andthe-case-for-war-powers-reform/ (discussing whether airstrike against Iranian
General Soleimani was constitutional); Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality
of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 253 (2004) (discussing the role of Congress in
validating President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq).
260. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 33–39 (2007) (providing a summary
of the duties and functions of the Office of Legal Counsel, specifically, that “[t]he
Supreme Court has never resolved whether the President can use force abroad
unilaterally without congressional authorization” and “[w]hen OLC writes its
legal opinions supporting broad presidential authority in these contexts . . . they
cite executive branch precedents . . . as often as court opinions”); see also Prakash,
supra note 68, at 1428–29 (“Presidents often can readily secure an opinion from
the Office of Legal Counsel supporting their actions.” (citing Eric A. Posner,
Deference to the Executive in the United States After September 11: Congress, the
Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 227–31
(2012))); see also Petty, supra note 257, at 95 (“[N]o U.S. federal court has ever
found a U.S. war to be unlawful.”).
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the legality of the order. 261 What then is a military member
to do? The President has asserted his authority to issue the
order and has determined it to be legally sufficient. Should
the military member violate the order, she may be subject to
a court-martial. 262 Subsequently, if the order is found lawful
in the court-martial, she is then subject to potential
confinement. 263 This ambiguity in what constitutes a lawful
order establishes what ultimately serves as the presumption
that any order of the President is a lawful one. And the effect
of that presumption is that military members are left to
follow those orders, even if they desire to remain faithful to
the Constitution. 264
261. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, How Obama Ignored Congress, and Misled
America, on War in Libya, ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2012/09/how-obama-ignored-congress-and-misled-americaon-war-in-libya/262299/ (discussing an OLC opinion that President Obama had
the legal authority to initiate airstrikes in Libya absent congressional
authorization); Andrew Cohen, The Torture Memos, 10 Years Later, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 12, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/thetorture-memos-10-years-later/252439/ (discussing the OLC memos written for
President Bush that found torture during the War of Terror to be constitutional
assertions of presidential authority).
262. See John Ford, When Can a Soldier Disobey an Order, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(July 24, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldier-disobeyan-order/.
263. Id.
264. Another potential option for the officer would be to resign. For instance,
when General Milley believed there was a threat of a presidential coup at the end
of the Trump Administration he considered resigning in response. The other
Joint Chiefs would then resign in turn, comparable to the events at the Nixon
White House when President Nixon ordered the Attorney General to fire the
Special Watergate Prosecutor. See LEONNIG & RUCKER, supra note 242, at 367. A
study surveying senior officers seems to suggest this is a common strategy in
wake of a legal, but immoral order. See Steven Katz, What Do Future U.S.
Generals Think About Dissent, Disobedience, and Resignation?, JUST SEC. (May
28, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/76676/what-do-future-u-s-generals-think
-about-dissent-disobedience-and-resignation/ (showing a survey of military
officers revealed that “forty-three percent of officers were likely or very likely to
resign” when given a legal order affirmed by the Supreme Court to detain all
American citizens originally from high risk countries). But of course, a
Department of Justice official did end up firing the Watergate Special Prosecutor,
and mass military resignations would likely have the same result in the
Department of Defense.

436

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Second, the military embraced a commander in chiefcentric view of civilian control of the military that prioritizes
near complete military subordination to the President,
resulting in further uncertainty as to whether the military
will refuse to participate in a coup. 265 The principle of civilian
control of the military remains a bedrock of American
politics. 266 This principle is seemingly straightforward: the
Framers subordinated the military to civilian leadership 267
to protect against a military coup 268 and ensure that a
“specified, politically accountable civilian authority has the
final say on national security and defense policy.” 269 But as
the principle of civilian control of the military is applied and
practiced through civilian-military relations, it is often
difficult to decipher what constitutes the “civilian”
component of civilian control of the military and how the
military must respect and adhere to that civilian component,
265. See Victor Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War
on Terror: A Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S.
TEX. L. REV. 617, 622–24 (2009) (summarizing the “commander in chief-centric”
view of civilian control of the military, and criticizing such a view because “[w]e
cannot accept at face value . . . broad assertions that any time a member of the
military, whether on active duty or retired, disagrees with the views of a civilian
member of the Department of Defense or other member of the executive branch,
including the President, that such disagreement or difference of opinion equates
to either a tension or a crisis in civil-military relations”).
266. See generally Risa Brooks et al., Crisis of Command: America’s Broken
Civil-Military Relationship Imperils National Security, FOREIGN AFFS. (May/June
2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-09/national
-security-crisis-command (“Civilian control over the military is deeply embedded
in the U.S. Constitution . . . . But over the past three decades, civilian control has
quietly but steadily degraded.”).
267. See Luban, supra note 31, at 530 (“The fundamental point was that, given
the need for civilian control of the military, the choice of making the president
commander in chief prevailed because it was universally regarded as better than
the alternatives of making Congress the commander in chief or having multiple
commanders in chief.”).
268. See Dunlap, supra note 22, at 386.
269. Andrew Radin & Thomas Szayna, Another “Crisis” in Civil-Military
Relations?, WAR ON THE ROCKS (July 8, 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/07
/another-crisis-in-civil-military-relations/; see also Michael L. Kramer & Michael
N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on Judge Advocates and CivilMilitary Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407, 1410–11 (2008).
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whatever it might entail. 270
From this uncertainty comes two primary views of
civilian-military relations: (1) the commander in chiefcentric view, which portrays the President and the executive
branch as the sole organ of civilian control of the military; 271
and (2) the separation of powers-centric view, which sees the
constitutional design—and the diffusion of military power
between Congress and the President—as the shared organ of
civilian control of the military. 272 And while both views tend
to assert civilian supremacy—the idea that civilian leaders
have the authority to be right or wrong, and that the military
must in turn follow the civilian orders even if they are wrong,
unwise, or immoral so long as they are legal 273—they differ
in who constitutes the civilian leader component and how the
270. See Pearlstein, supra note 33, at 801, 804–05.
271. See Luban, supra note 31, at 507–31 (discussing the historical formation
of civilian control of the military solely in authority granted to the President as
commander in chief); see also Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian
Control of the Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1826–31 (2007).
272. See Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Political Balance of Power of
the Military: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Armed Forces, the
President, and Congress, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 553, 571–72 (2007) (“The principle of
import for this Article is that control over the military falls into the latter
category of constitutional powers, with both the executive and legislative
branches of government vested with shared authority . . . . [T]he key to successful
use and control of national military power is that each branch of government
remains engaged in its role . . . .”); see also Pearlstein, supra note 33, at 803
(“[T]his Article suggests that the degree of threat to civilian control posed by a
particular exercise of military advice may be better evaluated in light of whether
or not it violates the formal constitutional structure and whether or not it serves
an identifiable set of functional constitutional goals.”); Hansen, supra note 265,
at 625–29 (2009) (“[B]y placing the President as the head of the armed forces
there is still the risk that the President would use the military for his own
adventurist motives or to threaten and cower the other branches of government.
Additional checks within the Constitution would be required to ensure that, along
with the civilian commander in chief to check the military, other civilian controls
were created to check the commander in chief.”).
273. See Peter D. Feaver, The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and
the Iraq Surge Decision, 35 INT’L SEC., no. 4, Spring 2011, at 87, 117,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ISEC_a_00033Feaver_proof2_updated.pdf.

438

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

military manifests its subordination.
In the commander in chief-centric view, it is the
President and executive branch that represents civilian
leadership, and any disobedience, whether it be expressing
public dissent, a refusal to follow orders, or to even engage
with the other branches of government, constitutes a
violation of civilian control of the military. 274 Glenn Sulmasy
and John Yoo fashion this view as a “principal-agent” model,
with the executive branch—especially the President—
serving as the principal and the military serving as the
agent. 275 For such a relationship to be successful, they argue
that the principal must be unitary in nature. 276 And that any
involvement by Congress or the judiciary—including being a
forum for the military to voice opposition to executive branch
orders—disrupts this unity and thus violates the principle of
civilian control of the military. 277
In contrast, the separation of powers-centric view allows
for a role for both Congress and the judiciary. 278 Under this
approach, the military remains subordinate to the civilian,
but here the different branches of government represent the
civilian component. 279 A military officer who receives an
order from the President that she believes to be unwise or
immoral may not only voice internal dissent but may also
engage with Congress or the judiciary in opposition to the
order. 280 Such conduct is not perceived as insubordination
but rather a recognition of the role of both Congress and the
judiciary in civilian control of the military. 281

274. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 271, at 1845.
275. Id. at 1826–30.
276. Id. at 1836.
277. See Pearlstein, supra note 33, at 824.
278. See Kramer & Schmitt, supra note 269, at 1419–34.
279. See Hansen, supra note 265, at 625–29.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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These views are significant in the context of a
presidential coup and whether the military can be trusted to
follow a potentially legal, but likely immoral, presidential
order to execute his coup. 282 The commander in chief-centric
view requires complete subordination to the President and
his orders, with no involvement from Congress or the
judiciary. The only choice for a dissenting officer is to follow
the orders or resign. While the separation of powers-centric
view requires military subordination to the civilian, this
civilian component includes Congress and the judiciary,
thereby allowing the military officer to voice concerns both to
Congress and the judiciary if she believes a presidential
order amounts to an attempted coup. 283
Concerningly, however, the military has largely accepted
the commander in chief-centric view. 284 This embrace
manifests itself in how military officers voice dissent for
immoral but legal presidential actions. 285 A recent study
surveyed military officers on how they would respond to an
order found legal by the Supreme Court but believed by
many to be immoral. 286 The example used was a presidential
order to detain citizens from countries determined by the
President to be national security threats. 287 While most
officers expressed a willingness to dissent, they achieved this
282. Id. at 627 (“The risk that a president, as commander in chief, could use
the military in ways that would threaten our democratic system existed at the
time the nation was established and it remains a risk today. Hence, the
Constitution creates a very significant role for Congress and makes the military
answerable not just to one executive department . . . .”).
283. See generally Corn & Jensen, supra note 272, at 571–85 (discussing the
investigative role of Congress and “the importance of an informed Congress for
the maintenance of constitutional balance”).
284. See Jim Golby, Beyond the Resignation Debate: A New Framework for
Civil-Military Dialogue, 9 STRATEGIC STUD. Q., no. 3, Fall 2015, at 18, 19; see also
Daniel Maurer, The Generals’ Constitution, JUST SEC. (June 9, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/70674/the-generals-constitution/; see also Pearlstein, supra
note 33, at 801.
285. See Katz, supra note 264.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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dissent through resigning and not involving Congress or the
judiciary. 288 Much as General Milley threatened to resign
when faced with an order from President Trump that he
believed to be immoral as opposed to turning to the other
branches, this survey reflects the belief that when a
presidential order is given, the officer has two choices: follow
the order or resign. 289
Further, not only has the military embraced the
commander in chief-centric view, but the executive branch
has punished military officers who have adhered to the
separation of powers-centric view. 290 President Bush issued
several orders during the War on Terror that military
attorneys felt violated both the Constitution and the law of
armed conflict. 291 Most dramatically, the military attorneys
opposed the methods used by the Bush Administration to
interrogate suspected terrorists. 292 In response, the military
lawyers expressed concerns within the executive branch. 293
But when these concerns were not addressed, the military

288. Id.
289. See LEONNIG & RUCKER, supra note 242, at 330 (“If the president ordered
a military action they considered a disaster . . . if the president rejected Milley’s
counsel, the chairman would resign . . . the Joint Chiefs could demand in turn to
give the president their military advised . . . . They concluded they might rather
serially resign than executed the order. It was kind of Saturday Night Massacre
. . . .”).
290. See, e.g., Missy Ryan & Shane Harris, Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman Retires,
Citing Campaign of ‘Bullying’ and ‘Retaliation’ by Trump After Impeachment
Testimony, WASH. POST (July 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national
-security/lt-col-alexander-vindman-retires-citing-campaign-of-bullying-intimida
tion-and-retaliation-by-trump/2020/07/08/934bc6ba-c12e-11ea-864a-0dd31b9d69
17_story.html (discussing how following Lt. Col Vindman’s testimony in
President Trump’s impeachment trial, he retired from military service “over
alleged ‘bullying’ and ‘retaliation’ by the president”).
291. See Pearlstein, supra note 33, at 799–01.
292. Id. at 801.
293. See Neil A. Lewis, Military’s Opposition to Harsh Interrogation is
Outlined, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/28/
politics/militarys-opposition-to-harsh-interrogation-is-outlined.html.
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attorneys engaged directly with Congress. 294 In response, the
Bush Administration then “punished” the military lawyers
by attempting to strip different branches’ Judge Advocate
General Corps of much of their independence and
authority. 295
As such, the military’s embrace of the commander in
chief-centric view—buttressed by executive branch
punishment of the separation of powers-centric view—
mandates near complete subordination of the military to the
President. When the President issues an order, military
officers must respond accordingly. A refusal to do so may
then be perceived as a military coup, with the military
refusing to follow the orders of the civilian commander in
chief—a perception that military officers are trained and
incentivized to fear. Consequently, military officers trained,
rewarded, and punished under this system cannot be relied
upon to serve as a moral check by refusing any order they
believe to be legal but immoral.
Third, the rise of careerism and extremism in the
military casts doubt on the constitutional faithfulness of the
military. Regarding careerism, a central component of
military service is self-sacrifice and dedication to the mission
as opposed to professional advancement. 296 Nonetheless, as
the modern military has transitioned from a small, war-time
force to a permanent all-volunteer institution, there has been
294. Id.; see also Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 271, at 1832.
295. See Hansen, supra note 265, at 633–34; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A
Tale of Two Judges: A Judge Advocate’s Reflections on Judge Gonzalez’s Apologia,
42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 893, 897–99 (2010) (detailing the Bush Administrations
disdain for military lawyers and steps taken to isolate them from the decision
making process).
296. See, e.g., The Army Values, U.S. ARMY, https://www.army.mil/values/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022) (“Put the welfare of the nation, the Army and your
subordinates before your own. . . . In serving your country, you are doing your
duty loyally without thought of recognition or gain.”); The Air Force Core Values,
U.S. AIR FORCE, https://www.airforce.com/mission/vision (last visited Jan. 22,
2022) (“An Airman’s professional duties take precedence over personal desires.
Every Airman is expected to have the discipline to follow rules, exhibit selfcontrol and possess respect for the beliefs, authority and worth of others.”).
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a rise in the “profession of arms.” 297 And much like in other
professions, there is an increased focused on careerism, that
is an “individual’s propensity to achieve their personal and
career goals through non-performance-based activities.” 298
For a junior military officer, this careerism manifests
itself through a personal drive for promotion, assignments,
and access to decision-makers. 299 For a senior military
officer, these career desires remain in place, but they are also
joined by post-military opportunities, prestige, and national
fame. 300 Military officers need only look to both the Trump
and Biden presidencies as examples of how senior military
officers can quickly transition from military positions to
senior and prestigious government positions. 301
297. See John Q. Bolton, The Price of The Price of Professionalization, SMALL
WARS J. (Dec. 25, 2015, 4:38 AM), https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-priceof-professionalization; see also Mick Ryan, Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part
I: The Enduring Nature, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://warontherocks
.com/2017/02/mastering-the-profession-of-arms-part-i-the-enduring-nature/.
298. See Dan S. Chiaburu et al., How to Spot a Careerist Early On:
Psychotherapy and Exchange Ideology as Predictors of Careerism, 118 J. BUS.
ETHICS 473, 473 (2013); see also William L. Hauser, Careerism vs. Professionalism
in the Military, 10 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 449, 449 (1984).
299. See Richard Halloran, Air Force and Marines Battle ‘Ticket-Punchers,’
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1988, at A18, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/25/us/wash
ington-talk-military-careers-air-force-and-marines-battle-ticket-punchers.html;
see also Tim Kane, Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officersare-leaving/308346/; Ned Stark, Being or Doing in the Air Force, WAR ON THE
ROCKS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/being-or-doing-in-theair-force/.
300. See James Fallows, Chickenhawk Chronicles, No. 12: Careerism and
Competence, ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2015/01/chickenhawk-chronicles-no-12-careerism-and-competence/384
561/ (When discussing general officers, a lower ranking officer noted the problems
in rewarding competency, but warned “nobody in the flag [general] ranks will
admit this because they are direct benefactors and creators of the current culture.
A careerist is incapable of critical thought.”); see also David Barno & Nora
Bensahel, The Increasingly Dangerous Politicization of the U.S. Military, WAR ON
THE ROCKS (June 18, 2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-increasinglydangerous-politicization-of-the-u-s-military/.
301. See Phillip Carter & Loren DeJonge Schulman, Trump is Surrounding
Himself with Generals. That’s Dangerous., WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016),
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The rise of careerism in turn calls into question the
loyalty of these military officers. As junior officers compete
and position themselves for promotion, assignments, and
access, they may prioritize placating their immediate officers
or senior military or government officials. 302 Similarly, for
senior military officers hoping to advance and secure postmilitary positions, they must become political officers. 303 And
becoming political officers entails loyalty to the President
and the political party which controls access to these
government positions. 304 The President and senior military
leaders can both reward compliance and punish
incompliance. 305
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-surrounding-himself-withgenerals-thats-dangerous/2016/11/30/e6a0a972-b190-11e6-840f-e3ebab6bcdd3_
story.html; see also Bryan Bender, Biden’s Reliance on Retired Military Brass
Sets Off Alarm Bells, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2020, 7:41 PM), https://www.politico
.com/news/2020/12/07/biden-retired-military-443546; Brakkton Booker &
Claudia Grisales, House and Senate Approve Waiver for Lloyd Austin, Biden’s
Pick to Head Pentagon, NPR (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/president-biden-takes-office/2021/01/21/959232498/house-approveswaiver-for-lloyd-austin-bidens-pick-to-head-pentagon.
302. See David Barno & Nora Bensahel, Loyalty and Dissent: Getting Flag
Officers to Hear the Truth, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Mar. 19, 2019), https://waronthe
rocks.com/2019/03/loyalty-and-dissent-getting-flag-officers-to-hear-the-truth/.
303. See Lawrence J. Korb, Political Generals, 86 FOREIGN AFFS., no. 5,
Sept./Oct. 2007, at 152, 152–53.
304. See Jim Golby, America’s Politicized Military is a Recipe for Disaster,
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 18, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/us-militarypolitics-trump-election-campaign/ (noting that Presidents actively began trying
to identify and appoint officers who shared their beliefs and that finding these
officers became much easier because the military elite joined the political elite in
becoming more polarized); see generally Jim Golby, Uncivil-Military Relations:
Politicization of the Military in the Trump Era, 15 STRATEGIC STUD. Q., no. 2,
Summer 2021, at 149.
305. See, e.g., Brian Palmer, Fire at Will?, SLATE (June 23, 2010, 5:07 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/06/does-president-obama-have-thepower-to-fire-gen-mcchrystal-from-the-army.html (discussing President Obama
removing General McChrystal from command after he made critical remarks of
President Obama in an interview); Sarah Gray, Alexander Vindman Believed He
Wouldn’t Be Punished for Telling The Truth in America. Trump Proved Him
Wrong., BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2020, 9:01 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/vindman-opening-statement-punished-truth-trump-proved-wrong-2020-2
(discussing President Trumps removal of National Security aide Lieutenant
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Both junior and senior officers are then placed in a
compromised situation should the President issue a military
order to effectuate a coup: do they follow their oaths to defend
and protect the Constitution, or do they satisfy the orders of
the President and officers appointed over them? 306
Careerism allows them to potentially benefit from following
the President’s orders, or alternatively to be punished for
following their oaths. As such, careerism at a minimum calls
into question whether the military will disobey military
orders that call for a presidential coup.
Beyond careerism, there is also a continuing trend of
extremism within the military. 307 This trend is significant
enough that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin addressed it
in his confirmation hearings, vowing to “rid our ranks of
racists and extremists, and to create a climate where
everyone fit and willing has the opportunity to serve this
country with dignity.” 308 A recent Air Force investigation
substantiated his concerns. The investigation revealed that
not only are African American airmen “far more likely to be
investigated, arrested, face disciplinary actions and be
discharged for misconduct,” but also that they are less likely
to be promoted and one-third of them believe they do not
receive the same opportunities as white airmen. 309
Colonel Vindman after he testified in President Trump’s impeachment trial).
306. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”) The oath for military officers provides
that “I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic.” 5 U.S.C. § 3331.
307. See Keith S. Gibel, Why Defining ‘Extremism’ Matters to the U.S. Military,
LAWFARE (June 30, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-definingextremism-matters-us-military.
308. Todd South, Extremism in the Ranks Is a ‘Threat,’ But the Pentagon’s Not
Sure How to Address It, MIL. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.militarytimes
.com/news/your-military/2021/02/21/extremism-in-the-ranks-is-a-threat-but-thepentagons-not-sure-how-to-address-it/.
309. Lolita C. Baldor, Air Force Investigation Finds Black Service Members
Investigated, Punished More Often, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2020, 7:46 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/12/22/air-force-black-people-
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Even more alarming, there was a strong military
presence amongst the protestors at the U.S. Capitol
insurrection. Not only were military flags, tactical gear, and
patches present throughout the crowd, but more than two
dozen individuals charged in the insurrection had military
connections. 310 A retired Air Force lieutenant colonel
appeared on the Senate floor, dressed in military gear and
holding zip ties. 311 And it is a veteran who leads the far-right,
anti-government group, the Oath Keepers. 312 The presence
of such extremism suggests that some military members may
be sympathetic and even supportive of a presidential coup. 313
As the President may only need some of the military to
execute his presidential coup, this pocket of extremism may
serve his malevolent purpose. 314
Taken together, these three trends represent
dysfunction in the moral check of a constitutionally faithful
military. While most military officers likely do not support a
presidential coup or desire to participate in one, the current
state of what constitutes a lawful order and what civilian
control of the military requires places military officers in a
precarious position. As an order from the President is likely
to be a legal one, disobeying it subjects the officer to
punishment—either
professional
or
criminal—and
endangers norms of civilian control of the military. And while
more-often-investigated-punished/4004919001/.
310. See South, supra note 308.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Golby & Feaver, supra note 253, (noting that “[t]hose who had served
in the military were more likely than civilians to support the use of troops on
domestic soil”); see, e.g., Geoff Colvin, Retired Brigadier General Says Trump
Loyalists in Military Need Rooting Out, FORTUNE (Jan. 8, 2021, 8:52 AM),
https://fortune.com/2021/01/08/trump-support-military-capitol-coup-attempt/
(arguing that the number of Trump supports in the military who supported the
January 6 insurrection remain a threat).
314. See, e.g., LEONNIG & RUCKER, supra note 242, at 365–66 (General Milley
feared that President Trump had installed loyalists in the Department of Defense
that would advise and support President Trump in using the military in a way
he “considered illegal, or dangerous and ill-advised.”).
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military officers may resign in the wake of a lawful but
immoral order, the President may then continue to issue the
order until he finds military officers willing to support and
enforce the order. With the rise of careerism and extremism
within the military, there is a sufficient risk of the President
eventually finding a supportive military. Thus, the moral
check of a constitutionally faithful military serving to protect
against a presidential coup is in dysfunction.
B. The Political Checks: Intra-Executive Branch Restraint
and Public Opinion Opposition
The second category of informal checks discussed is the
political check. With the fading fear of totalitarianism within
the United States coupled with the fears of first the Soviets
during the Cold War and then the threats of international
terrorism in a post-9/11 world, government officials amongst
all three branches and academics increasingly supported a
strong unitary executive branch. 315 Led by a President
empowered by the judiciary and Congress, the executive
branch was best positioned to effectively and quickly handle
national security and any crisis that emerged. 316
But this investment of power in the executive branch
came with some guardrails that generally had a more visible
check on the presidency then the moral check: specifically,
the political check. A strong President still does not function
in a vacuum; instead, he is at the head—and at times the
mercy—of the executive branch, a sprawling bureaucracy
with countless agencies, subcultures, competing interests, all
with their own congressionally delegated authority and
funding. Similarly, the President remains the only
government official nationally elected, keeping him

315. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 29–35 (2012) (discussing the historical trend of
increasing presidential authority in national security matters).
316. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 304 (1996).
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democratically accountable to the electorate. While these
political checks—intra-executive branch restraint and public
opinion opposition—were operating and at times effective in
checking President Trump’s potential use of the military to
enhance his power and position, President Trump tested
them and produced templates for how future more
malevolent Presidents may exploit the nascent dysfunctions
in the political check to use the military power
congressionally entrusted to them to achieve a coup.
1. Intra-Executive Branch Restraint
The President requires the tools of the executive branch
to effectively use the military to effectuate his coup. To
sanction his legal authority to do so, he needs the
Department of Justice. To carry out this military mission, he
needs the Department of Defense. To ensure money
continues to flow to the Department of Defense and the
military, he needs the Treasury Department. To enable the
military with intelligence, surveillance, and law enforcement
capabilities, he needs the national and domestic intelligence
machinery of the FBI, CIA, and Department of Homeland
Security. Should any of these agencies suggest a refusal to
comply or assist with the President’s orders, a military coup
may be avoided. And should they refuse to follow these
orders or take actions which they feel are immoral and
represent a departure from democratic values, they may
then terminate a coup once the President orders or
commences it.
This ability of the executive branch agencies to deter or
prevent a presidential coup speaks to a theory of executive
branch restraint commonly referred to as the “internal
separation of powers.” 317 Under this, the unitary executive
may be checked through “internal review structures,
317. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314
(2006); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and
National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013).
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involvement of multiple agencies, inspectors general,
agency-generated procedural and substantive limitations,
professional commitments and reputational concerns, and
executive branch adherence to governing law.” 318
While some critics have suggested that this internal
check has never truly checked the President, 319 there have
been some recent examples of it at least serving as a
consideration or roadblock for Presidents considering using
the military domestically. When President Bush considered
invoking the Insurrection Act in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, he considered it from a normative moral
perspective, but also faced opposition from his Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, which ultimately factored in his
decision to not invoke the Act. 320 Somewhat comparably,
President Trump faced opposition from his Acting Secretary
of Defense, Mark Esper, when he suggested invoking the
Insurrection Act to quell the Black Lives Matter protests. 321
President Trump also found the Department of Justice
to be unresponsive and unwilling to support his agenda at
times during his presidency. He saw first Attorney General
Jeff Sessions recuse himself from an investigation regarding
President Trump’s ties to Russia, thus allowing the
investigation to proceed with some independence, and then
Attorney General William Barr refuse to endorse and pursue
his theories of rampant and widespread election fraud. 322
318. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J.
1836, 1858 (2015).
319. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 139–41 (2010).
320. See McGrane, supra note 223, at 1329.
321. See Amanda Macias, Defense Secretary Mark Esper Opposes Using
Insurrection Act for George Floyd Protest Unrest, Angering White House, CNBC
(June 3, 2020, 11:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/03/esper-does-notsupport-invoking-the-insurrection-act.html.
322. Burgess Everett, Jeff Sessions Grapples with New Round of Trump
Attacks, POLITICO (May 8, 2020, 4:16 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/05/08/sessions-grapples-with-new-round-of-trump-attack-s-244991; see also
Jonathan D. Karl, Inside William Barr’s Breakup with Trump, ATLANTIC (June
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Ultimately, following his electoral loss, President Trump
requested top Justice Department officials “just say the
election was corrupt and to leave the rest to me.” 323 They did
not comply with President Trump’s request. 324
Despite the apparent intra-executive branch check
operating within the Trump Administration, President
Trump pushed this check into a mild case of dysfunction. He
also provided a template for future Presidents to increase the
dysfunction to further diminish this check. Specifically,
President Trump used his authority to remove disloyal
executive agency chiefs and then appoint loyal chiefs, many
of whom remained in an “acting” capacity. 325 Most
noticeably, after Secretary of Defense Esper refused to
support the use of military domestically during the Black
Lives Matter protests, President Trump “terminated” him. 326
And while he did not directly terminate Attorney Generals
Sessions and Barr after their apparent opposition, President
Trump did assert pressure upon them until they resigned. 327
President Trump then exercised his removal authority
27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/06/william-barrstrump-administration-attorney-general/619298/.
323. Former Top Justice Dept. Official’s Notes Say Trump Asked Him to Call
Election “Corrupt,” CBS NEWS (July 31, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/trump-2020-election-corrupt-calls-jeffrey-rosen-richard-donoghue/.
324. Id.
325. See Peter Baker, Trump’s Efforts to Remove the Disloyal Heightens Unease
Across His Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/02/22/us/politics/trump-disloyalty-turnover.html; see also Natasha Bach,
All the Acting Heads of Trump’s Presidency, FORTUNE (Nov. 27, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://fortune.com/2019/11/27/trump-acting-heads-cabinet-presidency/.
326. Tom Bowman, Trump ‘Terminates’ Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, NPR
(Nov. 9, 2020, 2:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/09/933105262/trumpterminates-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper.
327. See David A. Graham, Trump Fired His Most Effective Lieutenant,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11
/jeff-sessions-resigns-his-legacy-attorney-general/575245/ (discussing the forced
resignation of Jeff Sessions); see also Ryan Lucas, William Barr to Step Down as
Attorney General Before Christmas, NPR (Dec. 14, 2020, 5:45 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/14/811276917/william-barr-to-steps-down-asattorney-general.
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beyond agency chiefs. Following his impeachment trials,
where the testimony of federal officers frustrated him, he
requested lists of disloyal agency staffers. 328 He then
proceeded to exercise mass termination of those agency
employees whom his closest aids and supporters found to be
disloyal, including top Pentagon aides, Homeland Security
officials, and the head of the agency safeguarding nuclear
weapons. 329
This removal authority for executive branch members—
a powerful tool the President can use to ensure loyalty and
punish disloyalty—is especially strong in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. 330 In Seila Law, the Court
considered whether Congress exceeded its authority when it
required the President to have good cause to remove the
single director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. 331 By a 5–4 decision, the Court held that Congress
did exceed its power, holding that “the Constitution gives the
President ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in
carrying out his duties.’” 332 To the Court, because the
Constitution vests this authority solely in the President, “the
executive power belongs to the President, and that power
generally includes the ability to supervise and remove the
agents who wield executive power in his stead.” 333 The Court
further refused to place limits on the President’s authority
when it comes to principal officers as “[t]he Constitution
requires that such officials remain dependent on the
328. Josh Dawsey et al., In Trump’s Final Days, a 30-Year-Old Aid Purges
Officials Seen as Insufficiently Loyal, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2020, 9:19 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-white-house-purge/2020/11/13
/2af12c94-25ca-11eb-8672-c281c7a2c96e_story.html.
329. Id.
330. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
331. Id. at 2191.
332. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 513–14 (2010)).
333. Id. at 2211.
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President, who in turn is accountable to the people.” 334 Thus,
future Presidents may not only rely upon President Trump’s
exercise of his removal authority to ensure loyalty and
compliance, but such an assertion is supported quite
explicitly by the Supreme Court.
Once he exercised his removal authority to remove
disloyal agency members, President Trump was then able to
exercise his appointment authority to appoint loyal
officials. 335 He regularly replaced career professionals with
expertise and deep ties to the agency with individuals whose
“tenure has been marked by questions about their
qualifications and competency or whose appointments
appeared to be improper or even illegal.” 336 And while Senate
confirmation is intended to be a check for such conduct, only
undersecretaries and above require confirmation. 337
President Trump also made frequent use of the Vacancies
Act provision that allows the President to have a non-Senate
confirmed appointee serve as an acting undersecretary or
higher in certain situations. 338 His exercise of this exception
was especially problematic at the end of his administration,
after he terminated several Department of Defense officials
he viewed as disloyal and replaced with his loyal members. 339
General Milley observed waves of new Department of
334. Id.
335. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Trump Stacks the Pentagon and Intel
Agencies with Loyalists. To What End?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/us/politics/trump-pentagon-intelligenceiran.html.
336. Danielle Schulkin & Julia Brooks, Loyalty Above All: The “Shallow State”
of the Trump Administration, JUST SEC. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.justsecurity
.org/73226/loyalty-above-all-the-shallow-state-of-the-trump-administration/.
337. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 659–62 (2020).
338. See Lara Seligman, Trump Skirting Congress to Install Loyalists in the
Pentagon, POLITICO (July 17, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/07/17/trump-loyalists-pentagon-366922 (discussing the Vacancies Act and the
exceptions to Senate confirmation: “someone confirmed to a position at a different
agency; the ‘first assistant’; and someone who has been employed by the agency
for at least 90 days and paid at least at a GS-15 rate”).
339. LEONNIG & RUCKER, supra note 242, at 359–68.
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Defense appointees that were President Trump loyalists and
supportive of extreme measures to ensure he remained in
office, causing him to have a good faith and reasonable fear
of a presidential coup. 340
While President Trump and these loyalists did not cross
the Rubicon and proceed with a coup, he did provide a
template for how a future, more malevolent President may
exploit the dysfunction in the intra-executive branch check
to ensure he has the necessary tools and executive branch
support to succeed in his coup. He may appoint only loyal
executive branch officers. If the Senate is not supportive of
these officers, he may then appoint them as acting officers to
avoid confirmation battles. Should these officers express
disloyalty, he could then remove them or attack them with
sufficient private and public rhetoric that they resign. And
this template is not limited to agency officers—he can
identify disloyal agency staffers and assert his authority to
remove them and then appoint them with loyal staffers. All
the while, the President ensures he has a unitary executive
branch willing and able to carry out his presidential coup.
2. Public Opinion Opposition
For supporters of a unitary executive, especially in
matters of national security, a strong feature and benefit of
allocating power in the presidency is electoral
accountability. 341 As the only nationally elected official, the
President is the most democratically elected federal
government official, and thus is most likely to be responsive
and accountable to public opinion. 342 Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule posit that it is public opinion which serves as the
most effective check against presidential adventurism. 343 A
democratically elected President will want to obtain and
340. Id.
341. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 319, at 15–16.
342. See id.
343. See id.

2022]

THE PRESIDENTIAL COUP

453

retain public approval to ensure he remains in office. 344 As
such, a President will not deviate beyond the guardrails of
popular opinion in flexing the authority granted to him by
the Constitution, Congress, and the judiciary. Quite
simply—the President will not use the military to effectuate
a coup, because the public will not support it.
Placed in the context of a presidential coup, however,
this theory falls short. There is something inherently antidemocratic and oppositional to public opinion in a
presidential coup. If the President were to contest the results
of a presidential election—or perhaps manufacture an
insurrection prior to the expiration of his term—and then use
the military to remain in office, he is actively opposing public
opinion as manifested through election results. He is openly
and notoriously disregarding public opinion to execute his
complete coup. Thus, not only does public opinion do little to
protect against a complete presidential coup, it may also
incentivize a presidential coup when he loses public support.
There may be instances where the President attempts to
effectuate a more limited coup, or perhaps an “elected” coup
where he maintains the semblance of free elections, while
simultaneously using military power to suppress his political
enemies and ensure his continued electoral success. For
example, he may choose to detain his political opponents or
to declare limited insurrections in American cities that he
believes to be disobedient to his directives. 345 In this limited
coup, public opinion may serve as a check as the electorate
can vote to remove him from office. But again, this check
assumes that the President will continue to have free
344. See id.
345. See, e.g., Nick Miroff & Mark Berman, Trump Threatens to Deploy Federal
Agents to Chicago and Other U.S. Cities Led by Democrats, WASH. POST (July 20,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/defending-portland-crackdown
-trump-pledges-to-deploys-feds-to-chicago-and-other-us-cities-led-by-democrats
/2020/07/20/fda42b8a-caaa-11ea-89ce-ac7d5e4a5a38_story.html;
Myanmar
Coup: Aung San Suu Kyi Detained as Military Seizes Control, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489 (discussing the Myanmar
coup and the military’s seizure and detainment of the elected president).
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elections. A President willing to effectuate a limited coup is
unlikely to be deterred by public opinion.
The Trump Administration also raises the specter that
perhaps there is public opinion and support for a complete or
limited presidential coup. In this scenario, public support
would enable the President to effectuate the coup as opposed
to checking his ability to do so. Beginning in his initial
presidential campaign, with calls to “lock up” his opponent,
Hillary Clinton, President Trump and his loyalists appeared
willing to resort to extreme measures to obtain and remain
in office. 346
In exchange for this rhetoric, he received support from
his party to actively challenge election results, by suggesting
that states not submit their electoral college results
consistent with voting results, diminishing the significance
of the January 6 Capitol insurrection, and continuing to
suggest that President Trump won the 2020 presidential
election. 347 He was able to engender this party loyalty,
because large segments of the population continue to support
President Trump and believe that the election was stolen

346. See Chris Cillizza, How ‘Lock Her Up!’ Just Blew Up, CNN (Jan. 10, 2020,
10:52
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/politics/hillary-clinton-donaldtrump-justice-department/index.html; see also Zeynep Tufekci, ‘This Must Be
Your First,’ ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2020/12/trumps-farcical-inept-and-deadly-serious-coup-attempt/617309/; Donie
O’Sullivan, Echoing QAnon Forums, Michael Flynn Appears to Suggest a
Myanmar-Style Coup Should Happen in the United States, SAN BERNARDINO SUN
(May 31, 2021, 12:27 PM), https://www.sbsun.com/2021/05/31/echoing-qanonforums-michael-flynn-appears-to-suggest-a-myanmar-style-coup-shouldhappen-in-the-united-states/.
347. See Jonathan Chait, A Disturbing Number of Republicans Support
Trump’s Coup Attempt, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 17, 2020), https://nymag.com
/intelligencer/2020/11/trump-election-coup-lindsey-graham-ron-desantis-fraudvote.html; Domenico Montanaro, Poll: Just a Quarter of Republicans Accept
Election Outcome, NPR (Dec. 9, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/09
/944385798/poll-just-a-quarter-of-republicans-accept-election-outcome; see also
Alex Shephard, Trump’s Republicans Want a Coup, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1,
2021), https://newrepublic.com/article/162586/michael-flynn-trump-myanmarcoup.
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from him. 348 As evidenced by the insurrection at the U.S.
Capitol on January 6, 2021, enough of these followers are
willing to resort to extreme measures to “restore” President
Trump to the presidency. 349 Significantly, President Trump
and future malevolent Presidents may tap into this public
support for a coup, along with the growing acceptance of
authoritarianism within the United States, to gain public
opinion in favor of extreme military actions domestically. 350
When public opinion begins to support a coup, it can no
longer be a check against the presidential coup and then
instead requires a counter-majoritarian check to protect
against it.
Therefore, public opinion is ineffectual in protecting
against a presidential coup. A President is likely to execute
a presidential coup for the very reason that he does not have
public support for remaining in office or for his policies.
Further, there runs the risk that public opinion may even
inflame the possibility of a presidential coup, with the
President currying public opinion to support him in the
extreme measures necessary—such as using the military
domestically—to succeed in his coup.

348. See David A. Graham, Republicans Back Trump Because of the
Insurrection, Not Despite It, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.theatlantic
.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/republicans-support-trump-because-not-despite-insu
rrection/618034/; see also Jonathan Chait, When Trump’s Next Coup Happens,
the Republican Party Will Fully Support It, N.Y. MAG. (May 6, 2021),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/trumps-next-coup-cheney-purge-riotinsurrection-democracy.html.
349. Graham, supra note 348.
350. See Matthew C. MacWilliams, Trump Is an Authoritarian. So Are Millions
of Americans, POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2020, 5:45 PM), https://www.politico.com
/news/magazine/2020/09/23/trump-america-authoritarianism-420681
(discussing research that suggests 18 percent of Americans are highly disposed
to authoritarianism and an additional 23 percent are also disposed to it).
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CONCLUSION
This Article began with a simple question—what stops
the President from using the military power at his disposal
from effectuating a presidential coup? It ends with an even
simpler answer: nothing. The military now serves as a
“loaded weapon” for the President to use at his will with little
formal structural checks. Congress has acquiesced in this
authority by delegating broad powers to the President, which
in turn the judiciary has blessed through an abdication of its
review authority. Any President may manufacture an
emergency, insurrection, or national security threat and
then rely on congressionally authorized and judicially
recognized powers to use the military to quell any threat.
And beyond this lack of formal checks, the informal
checks—the moral belief that the President would not abuse
this power and that the military would refuse any such
orders, and the political check that the executive branch and
public opinion will deter a President from using the military
to effectuate a coup—are also in a state of dysfunction.
The lack of formal and informal checks leaves only the
benevolence of the President as a protection against the
presidential coup, specifically, the President’s choice not to
use his power in an immoral manner. However, the lessons
of the Trump Administration must warn the United States
of the dangers of relying upon presidential benevolence.
While President Trump did not effectuate a coup, he
approached the Rubicon like no other President before him.
And in a political environment where incrementalism is the
norm, future Presidents are likely to continue to push those
boundaries to the point of malevolence.
There is a risk with the Biden Administration that these
dangers will be forgotten. President Biden campaigned and
has governed from a perspective of returning to norms and
civility. 351 There is a sense that, since President Trump left
351. See Andrew Solender, At Close of a Brutal Campaign, Biden Campaign
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office, the nation can return to normal. 352 But that belief is
predicated upon the benevolence of President Biden and of
future Presidents. The reality remains that the Trump
Administration occurred, it stretched formal and informal
checks to the breaking point, and it remains a template for
future Presidents. To protect against a future malevolent
President who finally fires the loaded weapon at his disposal,
there must be real and tangible reform, predicated upon
restoring both the formal and informal checks. Should the
United States fail to establish lasting reforms—independent
of the personality of the individual in the White House—the
real possibility of a presidential coup will only increase,
leading to a true constitutional crisis.

Urges a Return to Civility, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2020. 3:54 PM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/andrewsolender/2020/10/27/at-close-of-a-brutal-campaign-bidencampaign-urges-a-return-to-civility/; see also President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2021, 11:52 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-presidentjoseph-r-biden-jr/.
352. Joe Garofoli, Biden Promises a Return to Normalcy. Is American Ready to
Go There?, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 20, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com
/politics/article/Biden-promises-a-return-to-normalcy-Is-America-15883179.php.

